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1CHAPTER ONE
TUNKU'S CHINA POLICY: INHERITANCE OR EVOLUTION?
...the Chinese Communist Party is attempting to persuade the peoples of the Federation of 
Malaya, in particular the so-called "overseas 
Chinese”, to look to the Communist regime in China for inspiration and guidance...
Legislative Council Paper No. 23 of 1959.
Historical Overview
Among the many congratulatory messages received by the 
Government of the Federation of Malaya^ on its Independence 
Day on 31st August 1957, were messages from Chairman Mao 
Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai who informed Tunku Abdul 
Rahman that China had decided to give recognition to the 
newly independent nation. Zhou expressed the desire to see 
that the "friendly" relations between the two countries "be 
daily strengthened and developed". Malaya chose to ignore 
the diplomatic overture because it was bent on following an
1. The term "Malaya" is used to refer to the eleven states 
of the Malay Peninsula as well as the national unit existing between 1957-1963. "Malaysia" refers to the 
national unit established on 16 September 1963 comprising 
Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak and briefly Singapore. References to the total national experience from 1957 onwards will 
use "Malaysia".
2. For the full text of the messages see Jain, R.K., (ed.),
China and Malaysia, 1949 - 1983, Radiant Publishers,
New Delhi,1984, p. 31.
2anti-communist policy both at home and on the international 
plane. It saw no urgency to recognise China or for that 
matter any other communist countries. This policy was 
conditioned by many factors. The main ones were: the 
existing international environment, the demands of the 
domestic political situation and the black-and-white 
perception of the Malayan political elite of China's profile 
in international relations.
Malaya's policy towards China under the Tunku was very 
much influenced by the "Cold War" and the "containment 
policy" of the West against Communist China. Though it was 
not a member of SEATO it indirectly became an adjunct of the 
Anglo-American alliance system when it signed the "Agreement
oon External Defence and Mutual Assistance" with Great 
Britain which was a SEATO member in October 1957. Dr. 
Mahathir Mohamad aptly described the Tunku's foreign policy 
as one that was influenced by an "apron-string" complex 
which was manifested in Malaysia's firm belief in the 
Commonwealth, the Defence Agreement with its former colonial 
power and the presence of Australian and New Zealand armed 
forces on Malaysian soil despite the absence of a formal 
defence agreement with them.^
3. More popularly known as the "Anglo-Malayan Defence 
Agreement" or "AMDA".
4. Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, "Trends in Foreign Policy and 
Regionalism", in Patrick Low (ed.), Proceedings and 
Background Papers of Seminar on Trends in Malaysia, 
Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore, 1971, 
p . 33.
3With regard to communism the Malayan political elite 
were convinced that it was monolithic and ideologically 
committed to the Zhdanov doctrine of unrelenting hostility 
between the capitalist and socialist camps of the world. A 
Legislative Council Paper (White Paper) No. 23 of 1959 
stated:
The avowed aims of Communists all over the 
world is to destroy the existing political and 
economic systems of non-Communist countries 
and to replace them by a World Union of 
Communist Republics. This plan was conceived 
by the Russian Communist leader, Lenin.^
The Sino-Soviet conflict and the emergence of a group 
of neutral and non-aligned states did not change the Tunku’s 
bipolar image of the international system. If anything the 
rift signalled to the Malaysian leaders that the main centre 
of the communist movement had shifted to Peking, a shift 
that was more threatening to the security of the region. The 
invasion of Tibet in 1959 and the Sino-Indian border dispute 
of 1962 confirmed this suspicion. The outbreak of 
Konfrontasi (Confrontation) in 1963 and the role of the 
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) in fermenting it further 
entrenched Malaysia’s pro-West foreign policy. For instance 
the Tunku warned his fellow Commonwealth Prime Ministers at 
the London Commonwealth Conference of 1964 that "Communist 
forces were making a vigorous attempt to encircle Southeast
5. Legislative Council Paper No. 23 of 1959, The Communist 
Threat to the Federation of Malaya, Government Printer, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1959, p.2.
4Asia with the help of Indonesia"^ and that Soekarno was 
controlled by the PKI which in turn took orders from China.
In analysing the first decade of Malaysia’s foreign
policy it is pertinent to note that its content and
direction were mainly dominated by the Tunku and a few
cabinet colleagues, namely Tun Razak, Tun Dr. Ismail and Tun
Tan Siew Sin. They were:
Western—oriented and tend to look to Europe 
for opportunities for diplomatic initiative 
....They are all Westernized, pragmatic and
conservative.7
Thus it was quite natural for Malaysia in its early days 
to adopt a staunch pro-West foreign policy free from the 
rhetoric of "neutralism” .
Domestic Politics
Nevertheless it was the domestic political situation 
that really shaped Malaysia’s external relations, in 
particular its experience with communist insurgency and the 
pluralistic nature of its population. Originally the 
communist movement in Malaysia was inspired and directed by 
the Communist Party of China (CPC). The first Comintern 
agent sent to Malaya, Fu Ta Ching,^ was a member of the 
CPC and the CPM after its formation in 1930 made use of
6. van der Kroef, Justus, Communism in Malaysia and 
Singapore, Martinus Nijhoff, Hague, 1967, p. 209.
7. Ott, Marvin, The Sources and Content of Malaysian 
Foreign Policy Toward Indonesia and the Philippines: 1957 
to 1965 , Ph.D. Thesis, John Hopkins University, 1971, 
p. 30.
8. van der Kroef, op. ci t. , p. 23.
5Chinese sentiments to gain grassroots support. The CPM:
...emphasized its Chinese identity, utilizing 
the pattern of hua ch *iao associations ... of 
ethnic pride, familial responsibility, or 
business relationships, to advance its 
interests. Sometimes even Chinese clanexclusiveness served MCP [CPM] purposes.9
This close identity of the CPM with the Chinese, which
continued into the post-independence era, helps to explain
the uncompromising policy of the Malaysian government in
isolating them from China.
With regard to the communist insurgency (1948-1960) the
Malayan Government inherited the perception of the British
colonial government that the CPM received fraternal advice,
inspiration and leadership from the CPC.^ The leaders of
the newly independent Malayan nation therefore felt that
they could not afford to make overtures to China, while it
was waging a war against the domestic communist terrorists.
To them recognition would be tantamount to legalising the
CPM. The presence of the Chinese minority accentuated the
issue further as the Malaysian government felt that:
The Chinese Communist Party... while seeking to 
extend its influence over the peoples of 
Southeast Asia gives special attention to the 
"overseas" Chinese.... No effort is spared...to 
induce "overseas" Chinese by appeals to racial 
or patriotic sentiment, to accept the new 
order in China and to co-operate in promoting 
its programme. By these means also an advance
9 . ibid. p.23.
10. The Communist Threat to the Federation o f Malaya, 
op.cit., pp. 8 -15.
6can be made in the Communist indoctrination of 
"overseas” Chinese and in preparing the way 
for the development of the Communist 
movement.1^
It is pertinent to note that of all the Southeast Asian
countries, apart from Singapore, Malaysia has the largest
number of ethnic Chinese in relation to its indigenous
population. Thus it was not surprising that the Malaysian
Government concentrated on isolating such a substantial
minority of its citizen from the centripetal influence of
China. The government’s attitude was also shaped by the
legacy of the British colonial perception that the Chinese
were "birds of passage", transient in nature who would leave
Malaya for their motherland once they had made their money,
and that they were "un-Malayan" in their political behaviour
as shown by their preoccupation with political issues in
13China rather than the political future of Malaya.
It was the result of these factors that made the Malayan
government choose not to recognise both China and Taiwan
right from Independence Day. Tun Dr. Ismail underlined these
facts in the following words:
One of the fundamental principles of our 
foreign policy is that it should be such as to 
ensure internal security and stability...the
11. ibid. pp. 8 - 9.
12. According to the population census of 1957, the Chinese 
population of Malaya was 2,333,756 or 37.2% of the 
total population
13. For a detailed study of the political attitude of the 
Chinese in Malaya between 1900 - 1957 see Ratnam, K.J., 
Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, 
University of Malaya Press, 1965, pp. 6 - 10.
7Federation [Malaya] has decided not to recognise either in order that none can 
influence the people in the Federation in view 
of the Government’s policy to weld the various races in this country into a single nation.14
Underpinning this policy was the fact that then neither 
Taiwan nor China had categorically dropped the provisions of 
the Nationality Law adopted by the Kuomintang Government of 
China in 1929. Neither wanted to abandon their claims on the 
overseas Chinese for fear of alienating them. Presumably 
they wanted to keep the issue vague as well as alive so that 
it could be exploited for their own political and economic 
ends in the future.
Apart from the policy of non-recognition, the government 
also took positive steps to limit Peking’s influence by 
introducing the Banking Ordinance of 1958 which prohibited 
the operation of any foreign bank that was under the 
effective control of a foreign government. The new law was 
specifically tailored to the Bank of China as it was the 
only one affected by the new regulation. Though it was not 
specifically accused of carrying out propaganda activities 
the Legislative Council Paper No. 23 which was released in 
early 1959 did mention the activities of the CPC in 
indoctrinating the ’’overseas” Chinese through ’’commercial 
intercourse”,^  a veiled reference to the activities of the 
bank. Such activities were neither new nor secret. Beginning
14. Malayan Parliamentary Debates, 22 April 1960, Col. 289,
15. The Communist Threat to the Federation of Malaya,
op. cit. , p. 9.
8in 1950 the overseas branches of the bank established their 
"Service Agencies". Overtly they were supposed to extend 
assistance to the overseas Chinese in sending remittances to 
China; to trace long-lost relatives; to arrange schools for 
those wishing to study in China; and even to provide 
services in writing letters for illiterates to their 
relatives. In reality they were representing the economic 
and political interests of China.
Admission of China to the United Nations
When Malaya joined the United Nations in 1957, in its 
first vote on the issue of China’s admission it chose to 
oppose the move. The reasons were quite obvious. Malaya was 
well entrenched in the Western bloc and heavily dependent on 
the United Kingdom for its external defence. The Tunku also 
felt that Malaya could not adopt a "neutralist" policy until 
it was "certain that the peoples in this country [Malaya] 
have become truly Malayan-minded and have set their minds on 
making Malaya their only home and their object of 
loyalty". ^  That China became a matter of concern and not 
India or Indonesia reflected the suspicion of the Malayan 
political elite about the loyalty of the Malayan Chinese as 
well as their political affiliation.
16. For a description of the role of the "Service Agencies"
see Fitzgerald, S. , China and the Overseas Chinese,
Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp. 27 - 28.
17. Malayan Legislative Council Debates, 6 December 1958,
Col. 5545.
The Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1959 further hardened
Malaysia’s opposition to China’s entry. It made use of the
incident to censure China and together with Ireland it
co-sponsored a resolution condemning the Chinese act as a
’’devilish and sinister form of colonialism” that was in
18violation of "human rights and fundamental freedoms".
Tun Dr. Ismail, then the Foreign Minister, defended
Malaysia’s stand and unequivocally stated that Malaysia
would never support China’s entry to the organisation "so
long as we do not recognise China, so long as China is an
aggressive nation, so long as the resolution of the UN
19accusing China stands on the records of the UN".
In 1960 however Malaysia took a sudden departure from
its policy. In supporting China’s admission, Malaysia
espoused the "two-China" policy. According to the Tunku:
...Communist China must be recognized as an 
independent sovereign nation, and as China. It 
is unrealistic to ignore the Peking regime and 
recognise the government in Formosa [Taiwan] 
as the Government of China. In the light of 
the existing situation, with a d_e facto 
government on the island, Formosa [Taiwan] 
should be recognised as a state, not as China but as Formosa [Taiwan].20
The sudden change could be attributed in part to the lifting
18. Statement made by Tun. Dr. Ismail at the 1959 UNGA. For 
the full text of the statement see Jain, R.K., op. cit. , 
pp. 39 - 40.
19. Malayan Parliamentary Debates, 30 November 1959, Col. 678.
20. Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 July 1960, p. 162.
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of the "Emergency"^ and Malaya’s newly found confidence in 
effectively dealing with the threat of communism from within 
as well as the Tunku’s displeasure with the US policy of 
releasing its rubber and tin stockpiles at the expense of 
Malaya's economy. It is interesting to note that the Tunku 
announced his China policy while he was visiting the United 
States. The dramatic change however did not in any way 
compromise Malaya’s pro-West policy as the ”two-China” 
formula was not new to most Western bloc countries. Thus at 
the 1961 UN General Assembly Malaya voted in favour of 
China’s admission with the condition that Taiwan should be 
regarded as a separate state with her own rights to be a 
member of the UN. However in 1962 Malaya abstained on the 
issue. The Sino-Indian conflict and China's opposition to 
the concept of the Malaysian Federation proposed by the 
Tunku in May 1961 were the main reasons for the change.
By 1963 Malaysia’s stand on China’s admission had come 
to a full circle. Malaysia voted against China’s admission 
because of its non-recognition to the newly formed Malaysia 
and its support to Indonesia of the ’’Crush Malaysia” 
campaign. It was inconceivable for Malaysia to lend support 
to a country that did not recognise its independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
It should be noted that China regarded the newly 
formed Malaysia as part of a broader "neo-colonialist plot"
21. The terra used to describe the period of communist 
insurrection of 1948 - 1960. It got its name from the 
"Emergency Regulation Ordinance of 1948".
22. See editorial Straits Times, 16 November 1960.
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to encircle and isolate it from the society of states.
Perhaps this Chinese perception was spurred by the fact that
the establishment of Malaysia was premised on the perceived
threat posed by communism to the region. The Tunku was
quoted to have said: "We have no territorial ambitions. All
we want to do is try to save ourselves from the communist.
9 9Otherwise, I won’t want Malaysia".
The immediate effect of "Konfrontasi" was the hardening 
of Malaysia’s pro-West and anti-communist orientation. As it 
was unprepared to defend itself against foreign intervention 
it had to invoke the Anglo-Malayan Defence Arrangement of 
1957. The termination of Konfronatsi in 1966 with the change 
of government in Indonesia did not in any way mark the end 
of China’s hostility towards Malaysia. It persistently 
branded Malaysia as a lackey of the West until the early 
1970s and Malaysia continued to regard China with suspicion.
ASEAN - China Confrontation
The establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) further estranged relations between the two 
countries. This time it took a different dimension as it 
involved all the five members of ASEAN.^ China looked at 
the Association with misgivings despite protestations made 
by the ASEAN leaders that it was not a military but a
23. Straits Times, 8 Feb. 1963.
24. The five founder members of the Association were 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei became a member soon after achieving 
its Independence in 1984.
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socio-economic grouping. Nonetheless China stood to its
opinion that ASEAN was a ’’military alliance’’ set up by the
reactionaries of the five countries ’’specifically against
China” at the behest of ”US imperialism".^ China
suspected that the Association could be used by the United
States to carry out its anti-Chinese policy in Southeast
Asia. As the Chinese perceived that the United States was in
collusion with the the USSR in encircling China, ASEAN was
sometimes also described as a "tool" of "US imperialism" and
9 A"Soviet social imperialism". This negative attitude was 
held by the Chinese leadership throughout the 1960s. Changes 
took place only in the early 1970s which eventually led to 
the thawing of bilateral relations except with Indonesia.
Conclusion
Malaysia-China relations in the 1960s were fraught with 
suspicion mainly because of Malaysia’s pro-West foreign 
policy, the subversive activities of the pro-Beijing CPM, 
the perceived insidious influence of China on the loyalty of 
the Malaysian Chinese and China’s active support for 
Indonesia's Konfrontasi policy. In the main, independent 
Malaysia continued with the policy which it inherited from 
the British colonial government which believed in containing 
China and isolating the local Chinese from the racial,
25. Peking Review, 18 August 1967, p. 40.
26. People’s Daily, 12 August 1967.
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cultural and ideological influence of Communist China. 
Nevertheless the policy had to evolve to meet changing 
circumstances. It was only in the early 1970s, when Tun 
Razak took over the premiership from the Tunku, that 
Malaysia’s policy toward China began to move in a new 
direction.
14
CHAPTER TWO
TUN ABDUL RAZAK’S CHINA POLICY: CONTINUITY OR INNOVATION?
Malaysia... accepts the fact that China has a right to play her part in international forums 
and to have an interest in the affairs of Asia 
....But we cannot accept or tolerate any form of interference in our internal affairs...we 
want to see China’s response , whether she for 
her part recognizes and respects our independence and integrity and our legitimate 
interests in Southeast Asia.
Tun Abdul Razak, 
15 January 1971.
Political Development in Malaysia
The racial riot that took place on 13 May 1969  ^was an 
important landmark in Malaysia’s history. Following the 
bloody incident a state of Emergency was declared, 
parliamentary democracy was suspended and Tun Abdul Razak 
was appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Paramount Ruler 
of Malaysia) as Director of the National Operations Council 
(NOC). He enjoyed absolute power through the various 
provisions of the emergency ordinances.
The incident hastened changes in the political 
leadership. There were pressures from within the United 
Malays National Organisation (UMNO) itself for the Tunku to
1. For the background on the causes and events that led to 
the 13 May incident see Goh Cheng Teik, The Thirteenth May Incident, Oxford University Press, K. Lumpur, 1971; 
and Tunku Abdul Rahman, May 13 Before and After, Utusan 
Melayu Press, K. Lumpur, 1969.
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quit as Premier and President of the party and hand over the
reins of leadership to Tun Razak. Besides that the Tunku
was badly shaken by the tragedy. He admitted that:
...all my work to make Malaysia a happy and 
peaceful country through these years, and also 
ray dream of being the happiest Prime Minister 
in the world were also going up in flames.2
The Tunku resigned in September 1970. Shortly afterwards 
parliamentary government was restored and the NOC dissolved. 
Tun Abdul Razak became the Prime Minister and concurrently 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He appointed Tun Dr. Ismail 
as Deputy Premier as well as Minister of Home Affairs. Tan 
Sri Ghazali Shafie, the Secretary-General of the Foreign 
Ministry, resigned from his post and was appointed as a 
Senator and subsequently made Minister with Special 
Functions. Later he also assumed the Information portfolio. 
The three of them became the new "troika” in the formulation 
of Malaysian foreign policy.
The resignation of Tunku Abdul Rahman saw the 
re-emergence of Tun Dr. Ismail and the ascendancy of Tan Sri 
Ghazali Shafie in the making of Malaysian foreign policy. 
Tun Dr. Ismail in particular felt that, in line with the 
changing international order, Malaysia had to realign its 
foreign policy posture. It is interesting to note he was the 
first Malaysian parliamentarian to articulate the idea of 
the neutralization of Southeast Asia, guaranteed by the 
United States, the Soviet Union and China and to be
2. Tunku Abdul Rahman, op. cit. pp. 93-94.
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accompanied by a series of non-aggression pacts among the 
states of the region, soon after the British announcement in 
July 1967 of its plan to withdraw its military presence from 
east of Suez by 1971. The proposal was brushed aside by the 
Tunku only to be taken up by Tun Razak when he came to power 
in 1970.
With the resignation of the Tunku, the "new troika” was 
able to examine old myths and new realities without being 
inhibited by or having to take into account the Tunku’s 
constraining influence. It was a fact that the first decade 
of Malaysian foreign policy was dominated by the Tunku. 
Malaysia’s close association with the Commonwealth, its 
pro-West policy, the formation of Malaysia and subsequently 
the expulsion of Singapore from the Federation in 1965 were 
some of the major policy decisions in which the Tunku played 
a dominant part.
Changes in Malaysian Foreign Policy
Indonesia’s Konfrontasi policy against Malaysia to some 
extent was a blessing in disguise for in the long-run it 
softened Malaysia’s staunch anti-communist and pro-West 
foreign policy posture. Indonesia with its propaganda that 
Malaysia was a ”neo-colonialist plot” and the ’’tool of 
Western imperialism” was able to isolate the latter from the 
Afro-Asian group of nations. In its counter-offensive 
Malaysia had to send several ’’truth missions” to these 
countries and to lobby support for its membership in the 
non-aligned movement so as to blunt Indonesia’s propaganda 
from within. Malaysia however failed in its first attempt to
17
become a member at the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations 
held in Cairo in 1963. This prompted the Tunku to soften his 
"anti-neutralism” rhetoric. For example in a letter to 
Nasser the Tunku for the first time endorsed the five 
principles of "peaceful co-existence" which was reiterated 
in the Cairo Declaration.^ Hitherto they were anathema to 
him. Subsequently Malaysia stepped-up its lobbying and by 
the eve of the following non-aligned conference scheduled in 
Algiers in 1964, twenty-eight countries had already given 
their commitments to support the resolution co-sponsored by 
India, Ceylon, Nigeria and F.thiopia, proposing Malaysia's 
membership. However the conference was indefinitely 
postponed due to the coup d'etat in Algeria. By the time 
when the next non-aligned conference was held in Lusaka in 
1970, Malaysia's membership was more than assured. 
Malaysia's foreign policy then was fast becoming non-aligned 
and Konfrontasi had ended.
In fact, the first announcement made by Malaysia of a 
substantive change in its foreign policy posture was made by 
Tun Razak at the Lusaka conference, some nine days before he 
took over the Premiership from the Tunku. In his speech he 
outlined the goals and principles of Malaysia's new foreign 
policy. He said :
...with the detente between the two Power
Blocs, it is an important responsibility of
the Non-Aligned Group to ensure that the
3. Cited in Saravanamuttu. J., The Dilemma of Independence, 
Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, 1983, p. 72.
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interests of the Big Powers do not converge at 
the expense of the medium and small powers....
[T]he world today...is at least tripolar with 
the emergence of China onto the international 
stage... China and her legitimate role in the 
world cannot be simply washed away by those 
who are opposed to her...[T]he non-aligned 
countries have an important role to 
play...in...efforts to bring about the 
harmonisation of international relations on 
the basis of respect for the independence and 
integrity of states.^
While expressing his concerned about Vietnam and the
security of Southeast Asia he emphasised that:
It is my hope that in reaffirming the right of 
self-determination and non-interference in the 
Indochina area, the Non-Aligned Group would at 
the same time take a positive stand in 
endorsing the neutralisation of the area and 
possibly of the entire region of Southeast 
Asia, guaranteed by the three major powers, 
the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet 
Union and the United States.5
Thus the Lusaka conference marked the official launching 
of Malaysia’s proposal to create a zone of peace, freedom 
and neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia, which later 
became the cornerstone of its foreign policy. It should be 
underlined that in its subsequent calls for the 
neutralization of the region Malaysia persistently 
emphasised the need for China to be brought into the 
mainstream of world politics, a stark departure from the 
Tunku’s pro-West policy of isolating China from the society 
of nations. For example at the 1970 UN General Assembly Tun
4. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol.3 No.2, December 1970,
p. 16.
5. ibid.
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Dr. Ismail Ismail reiterated that:
The world today is no longer bi-polar. It is 
at least tri-polar. Specifically I am
referring, of course, to the People’s Republic 
of China, whose absence from this Organisation 
reflects a serious shortcoming of the UN...the 
denial to a big power of its proper role 
cannot be conducive to the establishment of a 
stable and harmonious world order. I...wish to 
reiterate...my Government’s call for ... neutra­
lization ... guaranteed by the...PRC, the Soviet 
Union and the United States.6
At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in
Singapore in 1971 Tun Razak again reminded the international
community of the unprofitability of excluding China from the
mainstream of international politics. Such action he said
resulted in China not accepting the existing international
order. To Malaysia, however, there was room for adjustment
and accommodation provided that China did not interfere in
the internal affairs of Malaysia.^
Finally at the Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in
Kuala Lumpur in 1971, after an enormous effort of personal
diplomacy, Tun Razak persuaded his five ASEAN counterparts
to agree that the ’’neutralization of South East Asia” was a
’’desirable objective" and that they should "explore ways and
means" of realizing it. The reasons for the initial
reluctance of the other ASEAN countries to endorse the
declaration were varied. Thailand and the Philippines were
members of SEATO and had American bases in their
territories; Indonesia had reservations on China’s role in
6. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, op. cit., p. 16.
7. ibid.
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guaranteeing the security of the region because of its 
experience with the Chinese-inspired abortive coup of 1965; 
and Singapore, who viewed the Guam Doctrine with uneasiness, 
felt that the declaration would further erode the presence
oof the Americans in the region. Nevertheless the
Declaration was an important landmark in Malaysia-China as 
well as ASEAN-China relations. It constituted an 
acknowledgement by all five ASEAN members of the role of 
China in the maintenance of peace and stability in the 
region despite their non-recognition (except Indonesia which 
had only suspended its diplomatic relations since 1967) of 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
Malaysia’s changed attitude towards China, however, 
could not be singly attributed to the change in political 
leadership. Besides the changing world order, as alluded by 
Tun Razak and Tun Dr. Ismail at all the international fora, 
there were other interacting determinants. Among them were 
the development of regional cooperation with the birth of 
ASEAN and the demands of domestic politics. They could be 
grouped into two; external and internal determinants.
External Determinants
The transformation of the international system from 
bipolarity to multipolarity in the 1960s was one of the 
realities with which Malaysia had to come to grips. However
8. See Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 December 1971, pp. 5-6 and Ott, Marvin, The Neutralization of Southeast Asia, 
Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 
Athens, 1974, pp. 11-29.
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it was the end of Konfrontasi in 1966, the announcement made 
by Britain in 1967 to withdraw its military forces from East 
of Suez, the ascendancy of Nixon in 1968 which brought about 
a dramatic about-turn in American policy, namely the Guam 
Doctrine and the beginning of American withdrawal from 
Vietnam, and the signals given by Nixon to normalise 
relations with China, that provided the impetus for change.
The experience of Konfrontasi changed Malaysia’s foreign
policy orientation. However it was not until Konfrontasi
actually ended that the rethinking took a more definite
shape. Tun Dr. Ismail, soon after the Bangkok peace talks,
when speaking to the Foreign Correspondent’s Association,
indicated the nature of the realignment by outlining that:
We look forward for the day when outside 
powers... accept our right as a region and as 
constituent nations of this region, to sustain 
our distinctive ways of life in freedom and 
prosperity without interference....We do not 
oppose the communist system in mainland China 
so long as it confines itself within its own 
borders.... We look forward to a regional 
association embracing Thailand, Burma, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.... Such a community 
would not be a military alliance. It would not 
be an anti-communist alliance...nor...an
anti-western alliance. I...envisage an 
organisation which would be first and last, 
pro-Southeast Asia, pro-development,
pro-regional cooperation and pro-peace.9
The rapprochement with Indonesia which marked the 
termination of Konfrontasi and the formation of ASEAN 
removed the most immediate threat from Malaysia’s most
9. Straits Times, 24 June 1966, p. 1.
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populous contiguous neighbour. This perception was further 
reinforced through the Malaysia-Indonesia Friendship Treaty 
signed in 1970. The treaty sealed any lingering doubts about 
Indonesia’s intention towards Malaysia as intrinsically it 
was just one notch below a non-aggression pact. Article 3 of 
the Treaty states that:
the two High Contracting parties undertake 
that in case any dispute on matters directly 
affecting them should arise they will not 
resort to the threat or use of force and shall at all times endeavour to settle such a 
dispute through the usual diplomatic channels 
in the true spirit of friendship and goodwill 
between neighbours.
Britain’s announcement in 1967 to scale down its 
military commitments and overall defence expenditures east 
of Suez beginning 1971 naturally had far-reaching 
consequences on Malaysia which hitherto depended on Britain 
for its external defence. Arising from that decision Britain 
was expected to allow AMDA to lapse. Thus Malaysia had to 
look for an alternative defence arrangement. This culminated 
in the ’’Five Power Defence Arrangement” (FPDA) involving 
Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, New Zealand and Australia. 
According to the Joint Communique issued in London on 16 
April 1971 the five countries agreed that "in the event of 
any form of armed attack externally organised or supported 
or the threat of such attack against Malaysia or Singapore" 
the Governments of the five countries "would immediately 
consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures 
should be taken jointly or separately in relation to such an 
attack or threat".
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To Malaysia the FPDA was an unsatisfactory arrangement 
as it markedly differed from the provisions of AMDA under 
which Britain gave an explicit defence guarantee against 
external aggression. In contrast the FPDA had a loose 
framework and was purely consultative in nature. Thus it 
dawned on the Malaysian leaders that they could no longer 
depend on Britain or its Commonwealth allies on matters of 
defence. In fact this apprehension was felt by Malaysia 
right from the beginning of the talks. Australia, for 
instance, made it known that it was only willing to commit 
itself for the defence of "Malaya" because it did not wish 
to be involved in the Malaysia-Philippines dispute over 
Sabah.^
The British decision to pull out from east of Suez was 
followed by the Nixon doctrine of disengagemnet from 
Southeast Asia. The message given by Nixon that the United 
States would reduce its presence in the region and that the 
Southeast Asian countries had to shoulder the major role in 
any fight against subversion, together with the loosening of 
the American "containment of China" policy, which 
subsequently led to the historic visit of Nixon to Peking in 
February 1972, further prompted Malaysia to find a more 
viable alternative to ensure its security. The proposal 
initiated by Malaysia for the creation of a "zone of peace, 
freedom and neutrality" in Southeast Asia "free from any 
form or manner of interference by outside powers" and to be
10. Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 June 1971, p. 690.
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guaranteed by the super powers themselves should be viewed 
within the context of this backdrop.
Malaysia’s changing foreign policy and its call on the 
international community to restore China’s legitimate role 
in regional and world affairs naturally became a matter of 
interest to the Chinese leaders. They were quick to respond 
to Malaysia’s diplomatic move as it provided them with an 
opportunity to have links with ASEAN. It should be noted 
that compared to its rivals in the region, the United States 
and the USSR, China was the only super power that did not 
have diplomatic and official commercial links with any of 
the ASEAN countries. China’s signal of assent was reflected 
in the reduction of propaganda against the Malaysian 
Government; the usage of the term ’’Malaysia” instead of 
’’Malaya" (thereby giving implicit recognition to Malaysia 
which it refused to recognise on 16 September 1963); relief 
supplies for Malaysian flood victims of December 1970, and 
the despatch of a Hong Kong-based Chinese dance troupe to 
raise funds for the same flood victims, a tour that would 
have been hard to imagine during the days of the Tunku. This 
confidence-building measures were further strengthened by 
the "ping-pong” diplomacy between China and the United 
States and the consolidation of power by the "old guards" in 
the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. These developments 
further reinforced Razak’s growing confidence in Peking’s 
commitment to peaceful co-existence with all states 
irrespective of ideology.
25
Internal Determinants
The 1969 racial riot brought to the fore the bitter 
reality that national unity was far from being achieved. The 
Government felt that there was a need to improve the 
economic well-being of the indigenous people, as the root 
cause of the racial conflict was the Malay feeling of 
economic deprivation, and to strengthen the loyalty of the 
Chinese and the Indians. Several measures were taken by the 
Government to achieve these objectives. Among them were the 
adoption of a new development strategy, the New Economic 
Policy (NEP), and the promulgation of the Rukun Negara 
(National Ideology).'*''*' However what was left unsaid was the 
centripetal influence of China on the loyalty of the 
Malaysian Chinese. India posed no problem to Malaysia’s 
effort as the Indian government had abandoned the dual 
nationality principle even before Merdeka (Independence) 
Day. ■*■ ^ Thus to effectively overcome the "Chinese problem" 
the Malaysian political elite felt that it was imperative 
for Malaysia to have diplomatic relations with China. Though 
this factor was not stressed when Malaysia made public its 
policy of rapprochement it is pertinent to note that Tun 
Razak highlighted it at the rally to welcome him home from
11. For details of the NEP and the Rukun Negara see Means, 
Gordon, Malaysian Politics, Hodder and Stoughton, 1976, 
pp. 391 -411.
12. See Dalton, J.B., The Development of Malayan External 
Policy, 1957-1963, Ph.D. thesis, University of Oxford, 
1971, pp. 110-114.
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the China visit in 1974.13 Later in an interview with 
Newsweek he admitted:
I had a long talk with Chairman Mao and 
Premier Chou En-lai [Zhou Enlai], and they 
assured us that as far as Malaysians of 
Chinese origins were concerned, they belonged 
to Malaysia and have nothing to do with China 
....This assurance was very welcome to us...so 
as to be able to tell the Chinese here that 
they are Malaysians and they have no more 
ties, not even emotional ties, with China and 
that they must now identify themselves with 
this country and integrate themselves into the 
local population... One of our main problems is 
to form a united nation out of people of 
different races and origins.14
The other important consideration for normalisation of 
relations was to weaken the morale of the remnants of the 
CPM. As the Malaysian Government perceived that the CPM 
received both moral and material support from China, a 
recognition by China that the Government of Malaysia was the 
legal and constitutional government could possibly be used 
to break or at least undermine the morale of the CPM. Though 
this issue was not forthrightly mentioned in the 
Malaysia-China Joint Communique of 1974 it was indirectly 
alluded in the "catch-all” phrase that "the two Governments 
consider all foreign aggression, control and subversion to 
be impermissible". Tun Razak however was able to exploit the 
outcome of his visit by saying that Mao Zedong and Zhou
13. See Straits Times, 3 June 74.
14. Newsweek, 16 June 65.
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Enlai had categorically assured him:
...that the terrorist problem is our internal 
affair and that we can deal with the 
terrorists any way we like...we regard them as 
bandits. They are not recognized by anybody.
The PRC recognizes my government as the legal 
and constitutional government of Malaysia, so 
obviously the Communists here are bandits: 
they are fighting against the government recognised by the countries of the world.15
Aside from political and security considerations, 
economics also provided a strong motive for re-appraisal of 
relations. Despite its support for Konfrontasi, China’s 
demand for Malaysia’s natural rubber grew from about 20,000 
tons in the 1940s to 200,000 tons in the late 1960s.^ To 
the Malaysian political elite the establishment of bilateral 
relations would not only increase Malaysia’s exports but 
would also improve direct trade.
One China or Two China?
The change in Malaysia’s attitude towards China was 
accordingly reflected at the the United Nations. Immediately 
after the termination of Konfrontasi, Malaysia revived its 
interest to see China playing its rightful role at the UN 
and world politics. However it did not depart from its 
two-China policy espoused in the early 1960s. During the 
debate at the 1966 General Assembly, Tun Razak, then the
15. ibid.
16. Wong, J., The Political Economy of Malaysia’s Trade 
Relations with China, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore, 1974, p. 23
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Deputy Premier, explained that:
...While my Government believes in the 
importance of the representation of the PRC in 
the UN, we strongly feel at the same time that 
this can only be considered together with the 
question of the fate of the 13 million 
inhabitants of Taiwan... Taiwan should be
allowed the right to remain a member of the UN 
while Mainland China should be admitted to this organisation if she so agrees.17
However when Tun Razak assumed the Premiership in 1970
Malaysia’s policy towards China experienced a shift. For the
first time since 1962, Malaysia voted for the admission of
China and abstained on the resolution stipulating that any
changes in Chinese representation should be adopted by
two-thirds majority. Subsequently when Tun Razak made his
major foreign policy announcement in Parliament in July 1971
he declared that Malaysia was following a one-China policy.
Regarding Taiwan, Malaysia’s stand remained couched in
innuendos. Tun Razak said:
...our China policy...is not a two-China 
policy or a one-China one-Taiwan policy. It is 
in fact a one-China policy, on the
understanding that the right of the people of 
Taiwan to decide their own future forthemselves should not be denied to them.18
Obviously Tun Razak did not want to be seen to be too 
hasty on the issue and wanted to gauge world’s opinion 
concerning the future of Taiwan before making a definite 
decision. However by September 1971, just before the UN 
General Assembly, Malaysia had to accept the changing mood
17. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol.l No.3, December 1966 pp. 
73-74.
18. ibid., Vol.4 No. 3, September 1971, p. 20.
29
at the UN. Its statement on the future of Taiwan became more
forthright. Tan Sri Zaiton, then the Secretary-General of
the Foreign Ministry, at a special briefing entitled
"Malaysia’s Policy on China" which was hastily organised for
Commonwealth Parliamentarians, unequivocally stated that:
...Malaysia’s policy on China is this. We 
subscribe not to a two China policy or a one 
China one Taiwan policy but rather I say this 
quite categorically to a one China policy...
[T]he problem of Taiwan...is essentially one 
for the Chinese people to decide...We do not 
wish to involve ourselves in the minutiae of 
the Chinese problem. We recognise that the 
problem of Taiwan is a problem that must be 
sorted out by the Chinese people.19
Subsequently, at the 1971 UNGA, Malaysia voted against 
the procedural resolution calling for a two-thirds majority 
and supported the Albanian resolution which allowed China’s 
admission and the unseating of Taiwan. The Permanent 
Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations in his 
explanation before the vote said that Malaysia would vote in 
favour of the draft resolution because "the Government of 
the PRC is de jure and de facto the Government of China and 
that it alone has the legitimate right to represent China 
and occupy China’s seat in our Organisation". Malaysia 
skirted the thorny question of Taiwan by treating it "as a 
separate issue which will have to be resolved by the parties 
concerned". 1 Malaysia made its explanation with the twin
19. ibid., pp. 43-44.
20. ibid., Vol.4 No.4, p. 13.
21. ibid.
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objectives of (a) swinging the voting pattern in favour of 
China and (b) clarifying its stand on the issue of Taiwan 
despite enormous pressure from the United States to continue 
supporting Taiwan. It should be noted Malaysia and Singapore 
were the two ASEAN countries that gave unqualified support 
to China’s admission, a fact that was well taken note of by 
Beijing.
Conclusion
Under the premiership of Tun Razak Malaysia’s foreign 
policy experienced a major transformation. Malaysia became 
non-aligned and espoused the creation of a zone of peace, 
freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia, to be guaranteed 
by the super-powers. Towards this end it was imperative for 
Malaysia to recognise China and to join the diplomatic 
campaign to restore China’s rightful role in international 
relations. Although there was much continuity in Malaysia’s 
concerns in regard to China, there was innovation at the 
level of policy. Tun Razak subsequently abandoned the 
Tunku’s policy of non-recognition and adopted a ’’one-China” 
policy, in contrast to the old ”two-China” policy, and in 
1971 voted for the unconditional admission of China into the
United Nations.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE THAWING OF RELATIONS: BREAKTHROUGH AND IMPASSE
Diplomatic relations can only be established 
between the two countries on the basis of 
peaceful co-existence, on China’s respect for 
our sovereignty and territorial integrity and 
non-interference in our internal affairs. We 
believe that all these should be manifested 
not only by mere statement but also by deeds.
Tun Abdul Razak,
14 August 1972.
The "Trade and Games" Diplomacy
Despite the ideological differences and Malaysia’s 
non-recognition of the People’s Republic of China, direct 
trade relations between the two were allowed to continue. 
Between 1957 and 1971 imports from China averaged 15.06% of 
Malaysia’s total imports and exports to China made up 1.4% 
of total exports. China had always imported natural rubber 
from Malaysia for its basic industrial needs while Malaysia 
imported a wide range of Chinese goods: from cement, steel, 
household hardware to consumer items like toilet soap, 
fountain pens, sewing machines, bicycles and textiles at 
very competitive prices. Between 1957 to 1971 the trade 
balance was very much in China’s favour because, unlike 
Malaysia, China imported only a single commodity from 
Malaysia - rubber. (See Tables I and II for details of 
Malaysia-China trade figures and imports by 
commodities between 1957 - 1971).
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TABLE I
MALAYSIA’S TRADE WITH CHINA: 1957 - 1971
(In M$ million)
Year Imports Exports Trade Balance
$ % of Total 
Imports
$ % of Total 
Exports
1957 36.0 3.3 28.5 1 . 2 -7.5
1958 45.2 4.5 51.6 4.1 + 6.4
1959 25.1 2.5 5.7 0.3 -19.4
1960 35.0 2.7 'T' - -35.0
1961 42.4 3.2 - -42.4
1962 45.5 3.0 0.2 * -45.3
1963 75.9 5.0 0.2 * -75.7
1964 106.0 6.7 -T* - -106.0
1965 101.2 6.1 0 . 1 * -101.1
1966 173.3 6.6 2.5 0.8 -170.8
1967 192.7 7.4 19.7 0.7 -173.0
1968 175.3 6.3 73. 1 2.3 -102.2
1969 174.9 6.2 136.4 3.3 -38.5
1970 164.8 4.9 66.2 1.6 -98.6
1971 137.9 4.1 53.4 1.4 -84.5
* Statistically insignificant
Source: As collated by John Wong in, The Political Economy
of Malaysia's Trade Relations with China, Institute 
of South East Asian Studies, Singapore, 1974.
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TABLE II
COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF SINO-MALAYSIAN TRADE 1957-1971
(Percentage)
Commodity 1971 1967 1958
Food 39.4 43.7 45.3
Meat 1.4 2.7 1.1
Cereals 12.7 23.2 6.3
(Rice) (9.8) (20.7) (4.3)
Fruits & Vegetables 16.0 14.6 14.6
Manufactured Goods 27.2 27.2 30.1
Paper 4.8 2.7 5.6
Textiles 9.5 7.6 14.7
Iron & Steel 2.8 9.0 1.5
Machinery &Transport 4
Equipment
.3 2.8 2.4
Miscellaneous Manufactures 8.9 7.8 7.4
Clothing 2.3 2.3 1.9
Scientific instruments 0.4 0.3 —
Others 20.2 14.9. 14.8
Total 100 100 100
Source: ibid.
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Nevertheless there was an attempt made by Malaysia to 
curb the growing China trade. In 1958 it banned the 
importation of white and dyed cotton shirting and sheeting, 
and dyed and white jeans. The importation of other types of 
Chinese-origin textiles was also curtailed in the sense that 
special permits had to be obtained from the government.^ 
Malaysia gave two reasons for the adoption of the policy. 
The first was ostensibly to prevent "dumping" so as to 
protect Malaysian infant textile industries and the second, 
which appeared to be the main motivating factor, was the 
suspicion that China was making use of its commercial 
network to influence the Chinese in Malaysia. These import 
controls were followed by the order to close the Bank of 
China. Beginning from 1958 until 1961 the volume of trade 
slided down. However the downturn seemed to have been caused 
more by the economic recession experienced by China, due to 
the failure of the Great Leap Forward Movement, than the 
partial ban.
By 1961, as the Chinese economy pulled through the 
recession, the downward slide was arrested and trade 
continued to increase during the 1960s. Because of the 
partial ban China had diversified its exports by adding 
sugar, rice, iron and steel and cement to its already long 
list and Malaysia did not make any further attempt to check 
the trade links. Even during Konfrontasi, when China 
diverted its rubber purchasing to Indonesia, Malaysia did
1. Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 November 1958, p. 635.
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not retaliate and allowed direct bilateral trade to go
unimpeded. The Tunku, known for his anti-Communist China
sentiment, in a rather highly moralistic tone, was forced to
defend Malaysia’s China trade policy. He maintained that its
continuation was beneficial to both and more importantly
2would alleviate China’s internal economic problem. However 
the main reason behind this was economic pragmatism. Chinese
products were cheap. If Malaysia were to import them from
3the developed countries, the costs would have been greater.
China on the other hand was fully aware of the relative 
importance of the Malaysian market in the Southeast Asian 
region. By the late 1960s, when the United States began to 
give signals suggesting an end to the ’’containment of China” 
policy, the relationship also had political implications 
for Malaysia, besides Singapore, was the only other ASEAN 
country that had direct trade links with China. Concerned 
with its international reputation China always tried to 
maintain its image as a steady buyer as well as a reliable 
supplier to Malaysia. For example at the height of the rice 
supply crisis in 1974, China substantially increased its 
rice exports, supplying 33% of Malaysia’s total rice 
imports.^ Thus when Tun Razak sent signals of rapprochement,
2. Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 Nov. 69, p. 633.
3. Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 April 65, p. 111.
4. See John Wong, The Political Economy of Malaysia’s Trade 
Relations with China, Institute of Southeast 
Studies, Singapore, 1974, p. 23.
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China made use of the longstanding commercial links to pave 
the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations. 
Malaysia’s positive response, besides from political 
considerations, was motivated in part by the desire to 
penetrate the Chinese market, paticularly to export more 
rubber and to find markets for palm oil, its new export 
commodity, and thereby correct the trade imbalance.
Breakthrough: Visits of Tengku Razaleigh and Raja Mohar
Two months before the announcement of the visit of the 
American President, Richard Nixon, to Peking in July 1971, 
Malaysia made its breakthrough to China. In May 1971 Tengku 
Razaleigh Hamzah, in his capacity as Chairman of PERNAS 
(National Trading Corporation) and Chairman of the 
Associated Malaysian Chamber of Commerce, led a 19-member 
multi-racial trade mission consisting of leading businessmen 
and four government officials to Peking for an ’’unofficial 
visit” in response to a joint invitation extended by the 
China Export Commodities (Spring) Fair and the National 
Foreign Trade Corporation of China. The mission, though 
’’unofficial”, received the full blessing of the Government. 
Tun Razak himself prematurely considered the visit as the 
beginning of a "people-to-people" relationship.^ That Tengku
Razaleigh led the delegation was politically significant
too. He was then the rising star in UMNO and had been
specially picked by Tun Razak to head PERNAS and Bank
5. Malaysian Digest, Vol. 3 No. 3, 15 May 1971, p. 1.
37
Bumiputra, two economic institutions that were given the 
task to help the Malays in trade, commerce and industries.
Members of the trade mission were well briefed by 
government agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. That four government officials were included as 
advisers to the delegation lent credence to the importance 
given by the government to the visit. Dato Y.T. Lee, an 
official member of the delegation, perhaps inadvertantly, 
before his departure revealed the political significance of 
the visit by telling the press: "If there is an opportunity 
we shall open the subject of the neutralisation policy of 
Malaysia and get the reaction of China".^ Tengku Razaleigh, 
being the leader of the delegation, was more guarded in his 
statement. He clarified that the main objective of the visit 
was to find ways to increase Malaysian exports as the trade 
balance was very much in China’s favour.^
Nonetheless the delegation was given the opportunity to 
explain Malaysia’s neutralisation policy and the desire to 
have friendly relations with China on the basis of the five 
principles of coexistence when Zhou Enlai, in an unscheduled 
programme, met Tengku Razaleigh. The meeting was politically 
significant because it was the first ever held by a ranking 
Chinese political leader with a Malaysian politician. At the 
meeting Zhou referred to the country as "Malaysia" and not 
"Malaya". What transpired at the meeting was narrated to the
6. Malay Mail, 6 May 1971, p. 1.
7. ibid., p. 6.
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press by Razaleigh in the following words:
He [Zhou Enlai] informed us that he followed 
the statement made by Tun Abdul Razak on the 
concept of neutrality, and he told us that it 
was also the policy of China to maintain a 
policy of non-interference and mutual respect 
for territorial sovereignty and integrity. I 
could only feel or think that this reaction to 
neutrality was quite favourable.8
Zhou also requested Tengku Razaleigh to convey to Tun Razak
that China had no intention of intervening in Malaysia’s
internal affairs on behalf of insurgents, immigrants or any
other group.^ After being briefed by Tengku Razaleigh
immediately after his arrival home from Peking, Tun Razak
enthusiastically expressed his view that China’s response:
to our policy (neutralisation of Southeast 
Asia) together with her policy of 
non-interference in the internal affairs and 
her recognition of the sovereignty and 
independence of other nations is very 
encouraging.... The words of Zhou Enlai bear 
great significance to the countries in this 
region....I am confident that the success of 
the Malaysia trade mission will pave the way 
to a better relationship between the two 
countries and their people.10
Resulting from the first Malaysian trade mission, China 
agreed to buy the entire rubber stock of the Rubber Fund 
Board,in addition to the commitment to purchase 150,000 tons 
a year at average market price.^ The Malaysian mission 
also invited the China Committee for the Promotion of
8. Straits Times, 18 May 1971, p. 1.
9. Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 June 1974, p. 28.
10. Malaysian Digest, Vol. 3 No. 9, 31 May 71, p. 1.
11. Straits Times, 19 May 1971, p. 8.
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International Trade (CCPIT) to send a delegation to 
Malaysia. An invitation for a Chinese ping-pong team and a 
badminton team was also extended, heralding a series of 
"sports diplomacy” between the two countries.
The CCPIT sent its trade delegation to Malaysia in 
August 1971. A contract was signed with PERNAS whereby the 
delegation agreed to buy 40,000 tons of rubber, 5,000 tons 
of palm oil and 50,000 cubic metres of t i m b e r . C h i n a  
proved itself a ready buyer for Malaysian primary products 
especially when the price of rubber had fallen to its lowest 
level in twenty-two years. It also showed its goodwill by 
agreeing to the proposition made by the Malaysian 
government, for reasons of security and the implementation 
of the NEP, that bilateral trade be carried out through 
PERNAS. During the talks both sides also agreed to promote 
direct trade which hitherto had been partly carried out 
indirectly through Hong Kong and Singapore. It was agreed 
tha t:
-all Malaysian exports to China would be handled by the 
ships of the Malaysian International Shipping 
Corporation (MISC) and Malaysian ports;
-all Malaysian imports would be handled by Chinese 
ships or ships chartered by them;
-China would create an account with a
locally-incorporated bank and Malaysia would create an
12. Asian Recorder, 9-15 July 1971, p. 10253.
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account with the Bank of China in Peking for the 
purpose of the direct trade;
-a local agent would act for the China Travel Agency to 
facilitate visits to China by Malaysians.
To further help boost direct trade between the two 
countries the Malaysian government established a Commission 
(Consulate) in Hong Kong at the end of 1971. The Commission 
also served as Malaysia’s window to China prior to the
1 oestablishment of formal diplomatic relations.
The second visit from Malaysia that was politically 
significant was the one led by Tan Sri Raja Mohar, the 
Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister, in November 1972. 
The six-man delegation was treated as an official trade 
delegation by the Government of Malaysia. Therefore when 
Raja Mohar was given the opportunity to call on Zhou Enlai 
the essence of the message passed to the Malaysian 
government became the substance of negotiation between the 
two countries for the establishment of formal diplomatic 
relations.
With Raja Mohar, Zhou Enlai discussed two primary issues 
that were of paramount importance to Malaysia, namely the 
overseas Chinese and the communist insurgency. Zhou assured 
Malaysia that China considered all overseas Chinese who have 
taken up foreign citizenship as having given up their 
Chinese nationality. With regard to the activities of the
13. Asian Recorder, June 25-July 1, p.10224.
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CPM, China considered the issue as Malaysia’s own domestic 
problem. As a sovereign and independent nation Malaysia was 
free to deal with them. He also alluded that China did not 
believe in exporting its revolution or exploiting the 
sentiments of the overseas Chinese to create political 
instability because such acts were tantamount to sabotage 
and ’’impermissible” in conducting relations among sovereign 
nations.^
Normalisation of Relations: The Obstacles
Despite the breakthrough in 1971 and the euphoria caused 
by US-China detente, negotiation for normalisation of 
diplomatic relations began only in June 1973. Malaysia 
realised that assurances alone could not easily overcome the 
"accumulation of years of bitterness, frustration and 
fear".^  Thus right from the moment when Malaysia gave the 
signals to China, Tun Razak assured the Malaysian public and 
his ASEAN colleagues that: "We will need to move step by 
step, feeling our way carefully in matters which so far as 
the countries of Southeast Asia are concerned, involve our 
very survival".^ He said:
14. Interview with Tan Sri Zakaria Ali, High Commissioner of 
Malaysia to Australia, 19 December 1986, who headed the 
Malaysian negotiating team in New York in 1973
15. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 4 No. 1, March 1971, 
p. 15.
16. ibid.
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...we should keep one another informed of 
developments in regard to our official contact with China in order to ensure that we act as a 
group on the question of having diplomatic 
relations.. . .17
Among the considerations which made Tun Razak move ’’step 
by step” were: Malaysia’s 12-year struggle during the 
Emergency against predominantly Chinese communist terrorism; 
the refuge given to CPM leaders in China; the daily barrage 
of hostile propaganda from the "Suara Revolusi Malaya” 
(Voice of the Malayan Revolution) which was operated by the 
CPM from China; and the experience faced by Indonesia and 
Burma in the late 1960s in handling their Chinese population 
in the face of direct Chinese interference. At the same time 
words of caution from its ASEAN partners also contributed to 
Malaysia’s guarded stand. It is pertinent to note that the 
ASEAN countries shared common fears as well as problems with 
China and they expected Malaysia, as agreed at the 1971 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, to pave the way to the best 
political solution pertaining to these problems prior to the 
establishment of diplomatic relations.
Thus to Malaysia normalisation of relations was not a 
simple excercise. It involved both political and security 
considerations as some of the issues were fundamental to the 
survival of Malaysia in the modern states system. Tun Razak 
himself, in announcing Malaysia’s ’’one China” policy, 
specifically assured the people that the questions of
17. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 5 No. 3, September 1972, pp. 113-114.
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China’s support for the underground movement of the CPM, the
continuous hostile propoganda towards Malaysia and its
leaders through the "Suara Revolusi”, and the presence of
the leaders of the so called ’’Malayan Liberation Movement”
in China‘S  should be "considered and resolved”^  before
the establishment of diplomatic relations. On the issue of
Taiwan, which was of political importance to China, Malaysia
had no problem in conceding to China’s requirement. Even at
the time of opening its Consulate in Taipeh in 1965 Malaysia
made it amply clear that there was a difference between the
20opening of a Consulate and the setting up of an Embassy. 
The Consulate was established purely to look after trade, 
investment and Malaysian students studying in Taiwanese 
universities and in no way meant Malaysia’s diplomatic 
recognition of Taiwan. Hence Tun Razak was able to make the 
forthright statement at the 1971 United Nations General 
Assembly that it was "beyond doubt that the Government of 
the People's Republic of China was d_e jure and d_e facto the 
Government of China". Thus when Malaysia formally 
announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
China in 1974, the Consulate in Taiwan was closed down with 
immediate effect. Accordingly the Taiwanese Consulate in
18. Ibid., p. 113.
19. Ibid.
20. Kementerian Luar Negeri, Siaran Akhbar No. 12/65/67, 
4 December 1965.
21. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 4. No. 4, December 71, 
p. 13.
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Kuala Lumpur was asked wind up its operation. Nevertheless, 
with the tacit understanding of China, people-to-people 
relations with Taiwan continued. The Malaysian Airline 
System and the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority 
(MIDA) continued to maintain their offices in Taipeh. They 
also took over the consular functions of of the Consulate 
that was closed down while Taiwan continued to have informal 
representation in Kuala Lumpur.
Negotiations for the normalisation of relations finally 
commenced in New York in June 1973. The first move was made 
by Malaysia and China responded positively as then it was 
actively expanding its diplomatic representation in the 
Afro-Asian countries. The Malaysian delegation was headed by 
Tan Sri Zakaria Ali and China by Huang Hua who were then 
Permanent Representatives of their respective countries to 
the United Nations. The UN was chosen as the venue because 
it was the most neutral ground to hold such talks. 
Furthermore as both the leaders were stationed in New York, 
time would not be a constraining factor for both sides to go 
into the finer details to the preconditions of 
normalisation.
The talks were suspended in July because of China's 
reluctance to include issues pertaining to the fraternal 
links between the CCP and CPM and the overseas Chinese in 
the agenda of work. China insisted that the talks should be 
confined to the general principles on which Sino-Malaysian 
relations should be premised and that the contentious issues
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should only be dealt with after the establishment of formal 
diplomatic relations. To Malaysia the Chinese proposition to 
merely reaffirm each others adherence to the basic 
principles of co-existence, without reference to the CPM and 
Chinese issues, were nothing more than diplomatic niceties 
and therefore politically unacceptable. Malaysia’s 
insistence was mainly dictated by domestic considerations: 
the presence of a very large number of overseas Chinese 
among its citizens, in absolute terms as well as in 
proportion to the indigenous population, and its long 
experience against the subversive activities of the ’’China 
inspired’’ CPM which was bent on toppling the legally elected 
government of Malaysia. In addition, the Malays who 
constituted the political base of Tun Razak and his party 
could never wholeheartedly accept the establishment of 
diplomatic relations without Malaysia obtaining some form of 
assurance that China would not interfere in the internal 
affairs of Malaysia either through the the CPM or on the 
pretext of protecting the rights of its citizens (the 
overseas Chinese) . The stereotype among the Malays that the 
Chinese were racial chauvinists was still strong. 
Furthermore the memory of the victory procession and the 
arrogance shown by some Chinese after the 1969 general 
elections was still fresh in the minds of many Malays. Even 
UMNO members cautioned the government at its General 
Assembly in January 1973 to be wary of the impact of having 
relations with China. They warned that if the government
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were not careful, recognition could make the Malaysian 
Chinese "become too proud"^ t a somewhat inaccurate 
translation of the Malay word "sombong" which means 
something between "proud", "arrogant" and "swollen headed".
Reasons for Malaysia’s Insistence
The links maintained by the CPC with the CPM had always 
been a source of irritation and concern both to the colonial 
government and to the government of independent Malaysia. 
Leaders of the outlawed CPM were given sanctuary in China 
and at the propaganda level the CPC never failed to send 
lengthy congratulatory messages to the CPM on its birthday 
anniversary or to highlight skirmishes against Malaysian 
security forces. For example on the 40th anniversary of the 
CPM in 1970, the CPC quoting the teaching of Mao Zedong that 
"the people who have triumphed in their revolution should 
help those still struggling for revolution", reaffirmed its 
"internationalist duty" and resolutely supported "the 
revolutionary struggle of the Malayan people". ° The 
messages and the activities of the CPM in smashing the 
"suppression" of the "reactionary authorities" were given 
prominence by the government-run media like the People's 
Daily and Radio Peking. In addition, in November 1969 the 
CPM members in China started broadcasting the "Voice of the
22. Asian Recorder, 11-17 June, 1975, p. 10207.
23. Peking Review, 8 May 1970, p. 13.
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Malayan Revolution" (Suara Revolusi Malaya).^ That the
subversive calls made by the "Suara Revolusi" were also
publicised by the Chinese media did not help to dispel the
suspicion that the station was established with the
connivance of the Chinese government. Thus before the
establishment of formal diplomatic relations Malaysia wanted
some form of assurance that China would sever its
party-to-party relations and cease interfering in
Malaysia’s internal affairs through the CPM.
With regard to China’s attitude towards the status of 
the overseas Chinese, Malaysia was not the only Southeast 
Asian country that doubted China’s intention. China had 
always kept this issue vague. The constitution adopted in 
1954 did not allay the suspicion as it did not contain any 
Articles that clearly defined who really constituted the 
citizens of China.^5 Malaysia therefore needed 
clarifications from the Chinese as it was generally 
perceived that China’s policy towards the overseas Chinese 
was similar to that of the Kuomintang Nationality Law of 
1929 which subscribed to the principle of jus sanguinis. 
It states that any person born of a Chinese father, or of a 
Chinese mother where the nationality of the father was
24. Short, A., ’’Malaysia: Son of Communist Insurrection” , 
Southeast Asian Spectrum, Vol. 4 No. 4, September 1976, 
p.7.
25. See Liu Shao-Chi, Report on the Draft Constitution of 
the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Language Press, 
Peking, 1962.
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unknown or indeterminate, is a Chinese citizen regardless of 
the the place of his birth.^ Stephen Fitzgerald in his 
study on China's attitude towards the overseas Chinese 
also observed that:
At no time did the CCP [CPC] actually state 
that it rejected the concept of jus sanguinis 
on which the Kuomintang law was based; and the 
evidence suggests that for public purposes at 
least the Party accepted a very broad 
interpretation of nationals of the People's 
Republic of China. The criteria on which this 
interpretation was based were never stated and 
the outer limits of China's overseas population 
never defined... [the CPC]...was prepared to 
claim the broad undifferentiated mass of 
Overseas Chinese as nationals of the People's 
Republic of China, irrespective of their own 
attitudes or the attitudes of the governments 
of the countries of residence... 27
Malaysia's suspicion, and for that matter the suspicions
of the other ASEAN countries, was further strengthened by
the provisions of Article 23 and 98 of the 1954
constitution. Article 23 states:
The National People's Congress is composed of 
deputies elected by provinces, autonomous 
regions, municipalities directly under the 
central authority, the armed forces and 
Chinese who live abroad;
and Article 98 guaranteed that The People's Republic o f
China would "protect the just rights and interests of
Chinese residents abroad". Thus Malaysia could never leave
this issue unresolved lest China would feel justified to
intervene in its internal affairs on the pretext o f
26. For details see Leo Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN 
States, Singapore University Press, 1985, pp. 152-157.
27. Fitzgerald, Stephen, China and the Overseas Chinese, 
Cambridge University Press, 1972, p. 79-80.
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protecting the rights and interests of its citizens.
Besides what were stipulated in the provisions of the 
1954 constitution, China also had a notorious record of 
explicitly carrying out subversive activities among the 
overseas Chinese in Indonesia and Burmaz  ^ despite the 
commitment it made in Bandung in 1955 to adhere to the five 
principles of coexistence. The posture taken by China in 
these two countries further entrenched the common perception 
that the overseas Chinese were a potential "Fifth Column", 
ready to be exploited by China for its political and 
revolutionary goals.
Thus, given its big Chinese population and the 
fraternal links maintained by the CPC with the MCP it was 
imperative for Malaysia to obtain from China: (a) China’s 
stand on the status of the Malaysian Chinese who had taken 
up Malaysian citizenship (b) the status of the 200,000 
"stateless" Chinese permanently residing in Malaysia and; 
(c) China’s recognition that the CPM was Malaysia’s own 
domestic problem and that the CPC should cease interfering 
in Malaysia’s internal affairs through the CPM. With regard 
to the Malaysian Chinese who had taken up Malaysian 
citizenship, either by their own free will or by operation 
of law, Malaysia wanted China to categorically state that
28. For details of Chinese subversive activities in 
Indonesia see Mozinggo, Mozinggo, Chinese Policy toward 
Indonesia, Cornell University Press, 1976, p. 157-191.
29. See Taylor, Jay, China and Southeast Asia, Praeger 
Inc., 1976, pp. 191 —  229.
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this group of Chinese people had automatically forfeited 
their Chinese citizenship. As such, Malaysia as an 
independent sovereign nation was free to deal with them 
within the framework of Malaysian laws. China in the future 
would therefore have no right to interfere in the internal 
affairs of Malaysia on the pretext of protecting the 
interests of this particular group of people. With regard to 
the 200,000 "stateless" Chinese who were permanently 
residing in Malaysia the Malaysian government needed China 
to recognise the fact that ’’they must abide by Malaysian 
laws”. It is pertinent to note that they were classified as 
’’stateless” because they were neither citizens of Malaysia 
nor possessed the legal documents to prove that they were 
citizens of another country. However under the principle of 
jus sanguinis, China could always claim that they were 
Chinese citizens and therefore entitled to Chinese 
protection.
Finally in October 1973 China agreed to include these 
three contentious issues in the agenda of the talks. How far 
China could accomodate Malaysia’s requirements will be 
analysed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: ONE-TIER 
OR TWO-TIER RELATIONSHIPS?
I should naturally not be able to comment at 
this Press Conference on any matters of 
substance affecting Malaysia-PRC relations 
whether it is the question of Taiwan, 
permanent residents in Malaysia, the Malayan 
Communist Party....I shall do so when I meet 
you again on my return from China.
Tun Abdul Razak 
27 May 1974.
Visit of Tun Razak to Beijing
When Tun Razak took over the premiership in September 
1970 he ordered the reorientation of Malaysia’s foreign 
policy. Consonant with his policy of creating a zone of 
peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia, Malaysia 
adopted a non-aligned and neutral foreign policy. Basic to 
this was the need to maintain an equidistant relationship 
with the super powers. In this connection it was imperative 
for Malaysia to recognise China. Recognition of the United 
States had taken place automatically on Independence Day in 
1957 and diplomatic relations were established with the USSR 
in 1967 following the signing of a trade agreement and the 
decision by the Russians to buy rubber and tin direct from 
Malaysia.
52
Moves toward the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with China went "step by step" according to the pace set by 
Tun Razak. The first step was to loosen Malaysia’s 
anti-communist foreign policy. In March 1973 Malaysia 
withdrew from the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) because 
it was a grouping established by the pro-West countries of 
the Asia-Pacific region in 1966 as an instrument to contain 
China. Then in June 1973 Malaysia established diplomatic 
relations with North Korea and North Vietnam. With the 
recognition of the latter Malaysia then became the second 
ASEAN country, after Indonesia, that had relations with all 
the non-ASEAN Southeast Asian countries.
Finally in March 1974 Tun Razak revealed that "the 
accord for diplomatic ties will be successfully concluded 
soon",^ confirming the rampant speculation that he himself 
would visit Beijing for the occasion. A belated official 
announcement was made by the Foreign Ministry on 21 May 1974 
which confirmed that "the Governments of Malaysia and the 
People’s Republic of China have agreed in principle to 
establish full diplomatic relations and that on the 
invitation from Premier Chou Enlai, Tun Razak would pay an 
official visit to the PRC from May 28 to June 2, 1974’’^  to 
formalise the agreement on the establishment of diplomatic 
relations.
It is interesting to note that Tun Razak’s visit could
1. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, January-March 1974, p. 27.
2. Malaysian Digest, 30 May 1974, p. 1.
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have taken place much earlier as the agreement had been 
concluded in December 1973. However it was timed in such a 
way as to immediately precede the general elections held in 
August 1974, the first to be held after the 1969 general 
elections when most of the candidates of the Malaysian 
Chinese Association (MCA), UMNO’s partner in the ruling 
Alliance Party, were humiliatingly trounced in 
Chinese-dominated constituencies by Chinese candidates from 
the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Gerakan 
Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) who in the main claimed that the 
MCA (which was now part of the new Barisan Nasional, the 
successor to the old Alliance) was neglecting the non-Malays 
by towing UMNO’s policy.^ Thus the timing of the visit was 
also predicated on domestic political considerations: to
prop up the image of the MCA and to some extent to weaken 
the perception among the Chinese community that Tun Razak 
was anti-Chinese. During the election campaign, posters of 
Tun Razak shaking hands with Chairman Mao with the slogan 
’’Barisan Nasional is for Racial Harmony” were fully 
exploited by MCA candidates to win Chinese votes.
Outcome of Visit
The joint communique signed by Tun Razak and Zhou Enlai 
in essence covered two broad areas. The first dealt with the
3.The issues raised by the non—Malay opposition parties 
revolved around the special rights of the Malays contained 
in Article 153 of the Federal Constitution. For details 
see Means, G., ojd. cit. , pp. 391-397.
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principles of Sino-Malaysian relations and the second 
concerned agreements on the question of the nationality of 
people of Chinese origin residing in Malaysia - the 
"stateless" Chinese and those who had become Malaysian 
citizens by operation of law, naturalization or 
registration.
The principles of Sino-Malaysian relations were covered
in the communique by operative paragraphs one to four (see
Appendix A). They dealt first of all with mutual recognition
and the decision of the two governments to establish
diplomatic relations from the date of the signing of the
communique - 31 May 1974. The second paragraph referred to
mutual adherence to the five principles of peaceful
co-existence, namely mutual respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression,
non-interference, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful
coexistence. In the third paragraph China recognised the
Government of Malaysia and respected the independence and
integrity of Malaysia while in turn Malaysia recognised the
Government of the People’s Republic of China and
acknowledged that Taiwan was an ’’inalienable" part of its
territory. These were also basic general principles which as
far as Malaysia was concerned, needed further elaboration.
Hence the inclusion in the agreement that:
The two governments consider all foreign 
aggression, interference, control and
subversion to be impermissible. They hold that 
the social system of a country should only be 
chosen and decided by its own people. They are 
opposed to any attempt by any country or group 
of countries to establish hegemony or create 
spheres of influence in any part of the world.
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Malaysia’s insistence on the inclusion of this
paragraph stemmed from China’s reluctance to abandon its 
party-to-party relations with the CPM. Malaysia hoped that 
the inclusion of this additional principle would restrict 
China’s links with the CPM. Anything that went beyond moral 
support could be construed as ’’subversion and aggression’’ 
and therefore ’’impermissible” in the conduct of foreign 
relations. Tun Razak at the rally welcoming him home from 
the China visit, emphasised the significance of these 
principles. He said:
The... principles have far reaching
implications for our internal as well as 
external affairs. Chairman Mao and Premier 
Chou [Zhou]...have categorically assured that 
they regard the remnant terrorists... as our 
internal problem which it is for us to deal 
with as we think best. The PRC has 
unequivocally stated that the social system in 
any country is for the people of that country 
alone to choose and decide. Our social system 
has been freely chosen by our people based on 
our national ideology, the Rukun Negara.... The 
struggle of the terrorists [CPM] to impose by 
force another system which has been rejected 
by our people is hopeless and futile. The PRC 
recognises Malaysia and its independence and 
sovereignty. The PRC rejects foreign 
aggression, interference, control and 
subversion. The terrorists cannot claim that 
they are fighting for freedom.^
Thus the CPM was Malaysia’s own internal problem and it
could take any action against them without affecting the
cordiality of bilateral relations. Tun Razak
further underscored this point when he told the crowd
welcoming him home that Mao Zedong had told him that the CPM
4. Siaran Akhbar, 6/74/11 (PM), 2 June 1974.
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"is a matter for you to solve in whatever way you think
fit".5
With regard to the law of nationality both the 
Governments declared that they did not recognize dual 
nationality. Based on this principle the "Chinese Government 
considers anyone of Chinese origin who has taken up of his 
own free will or acquired Malaysian nationality as 
automatically forfeiting Chinese nationality". As for the 
non-Malaysian Chinese residing in Malaysia the Chinese 
Government "acting in accordance with its consistent policy, 
will enjoin them to abide by the law of the Government of 
Malaysia, respect the customs and habits of the people there 
and and live in amity with them".
Malaysia’s insistence that agreement on the issue of 
nationality should be clearly stated was dictated by two 
main considerations. Firstly, it wanted to remove the 
possibility of Chinese interference in its internal affairs 
on the pretext of protecting the interests of its nationals. 
The majority of the ethnic Chinese were Malaysian citizens 
and therefore aliens to China. As for those who chose to 
remain Chinese nationals, China admitted the need for them 
to abide "by the law of the Government of Malaysia", thus 
removing the possibility of a repeat of the experience faced 
by Burma and Indonesia where Chinese nationals were 
incited by the Chinese Embassy not to obey local laws on the 
excuse that they were non-citizens. Secondly, Malaysia
5. New Straits Times, 3 June 1974, p. 1.
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needed this definite clarification so that the Chinese in
Malaysia would not have any doubts regarding their status
and future. Thus when Tun Razak arrived home from China
he forthrightly told the Malaysian Chinese that:
People of Chinese origin who have taken up 
Malaysian nationality are automatically not 
Chinese nationals. It will therefore be 
absolutely clear that there would be no future 
in Malaysia for fence sitters, for people 
whose loyalties are divided.... We are all 
Malaysians and our...future lies...in 
Malaysia. As Malaysians we should view our new 
relationship with the PRC as a logical
development of our foreign policy. The PRC 
mission should be regarded as no more than one 
other foreign mission functioning in Kuala 
Lumpur.6
It was for this reason that the nationality issue 
dominated most of the schedule of the negotiations in New 
York and was the main cause of the negotiation being 
suspended for several months when China insisted that the 
issue be resolved only after the establishment of formal 
diplomatic relations. China's reluctance should be viewed 
within the context of China-Taiwan rivalry to gain the 
allegiance of the overseas Chinese. Since its birth in 1950 
the PRC had kept the issue ambiguous so that if the need 
arose the issue could be exploited to its advantage. Thus in 
its negotiations with Malaysia, China preferred to skirt the 
issue for fear of being accused by Taiwan of having 
compromised the interests of the overseas Chinese. Malaysia 
on the contrary wanted a specific agreement to be accepted 
and initialled in advance which would be foraalised after the
6. Siaran Akhbar, 6/74/11 (PM), 2 June 1974.
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normalisation of relations. The deadlock was overcome when 
China accepted that for Malaysia the settlement of the 
nationality issue was the key condition to normalisation. 
Consequently it was agreed that the general principles 
regarding the issue would be included in the Joint 
Communique although not in the formal agreement that 
Malaysia sought. This was the main reason why Malaysia 
insisted that the Joint Communique be signed by both the 
Prime Ministers; Tun Razak and Zhou Enlai. Though the 
Communique lacked the legal force of a treaty, Malaysia took 
the view that morally it would be difficult for China to go 
against its commitment.
The inclusion of the issues relating to the overseas 
Chinese and China’s adherence to the five principles of 
coexistence in the Joint Communique was a breakthrough not 
only for Malaysia but all the ASEAN countries which in 
varying degrees harboured similar suspicions regarding 
China’s intentions towards the region. Basically their 
suspicions stemmed from China's ambiguous attitude towards 
the overseas Chinese, the presence of China-inspired 
communist insurgencies, and the question of integrating the 
overseas Chinese with the indigenous population. To most of 
the ASEAN countries these issues were viewed as complex and 
inter-related. However in its negotiations Malaysia was able 
to reach separate agreements on each of these issues which 
served as models for the other ASEAN states. Thus when 
Thailand and the Philippines normalised their relations with
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China the negotiations were both brief and smooth. They used 
the Tun Razak-Zhou Enlai communique as the basis for their 
negotiations and in fact the paragraph on non-recognition of 
dual nationality was adopted word for word by both in their 
joint communiques.
In the Joint Communique Malaysia got nearly all the 
commitments it wanted from China except an explicit 
assurance that it would sever its fraternal links with the 
CPM. Instead Malaysia obtained a general assurance in the 
second operative paragraph declaring that "all foreign 
aggression, interference, control and subversion to be 
impermissible". Zhou Enlai in his speech at the banquet 
honouring Tun Razak in no uncertain terra explained the 
reason for this stand:
The Chinese people consistently support the 
just struggles of all oppressed nations and 
peoples. This is our internationalist duty. 
[emphasis mine"] . . . /
However in the same speech Zhou Enlai envisaged the
possibility that the support could be moral rather than
material when he said that:
We hold at the same time that the social 
system of a country can only be chosen and 
decided by its own people and cannot be 
imposed by other countries.8
Nevertheless Malaysia obtained verbal assurances both 
from Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou that the CPM was 
Malaysia’s own internal problem and it could deal with it as
7. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol.7 No.7, June 1974, p. 43.
8. ibid.
60
it pleased. Tun Razak amplified this in a special press
conference to Malaysian journalists in China. He explained:
Then I brought up the question of the 
terrorists. The majority of Chinese in 
Malaysia, of course, are loyal to the country 
but there is a small group of terrorists which 
is causing trouble in our country....The existence of this group may hinder the 
progress of our diplomatic relations and our 
good relationship.... Chairman Mao said no, this is a matter for you. The terrorists are 
an internal matter for Malaysia and you can do what you like....9
With regard to the future of the 200,000 ’’stateless” 
Chinese residing in Malaysia, China did not make any 
commitment beyond what was stated in the Joint Communique, 
"that they should abide by the law of the Government of 
Malaysia". Only Tun Razak elaborated on this issue by saying 
that:
This matter should be examined after 
relations have been established. As far as China is concerned, if these people want to 
become Chinese nationals, China is prepared to 
issue them with Chinese passports. They say that if these people want to become citizens of China they will accept them.10
However after the establishment of diplomatic relations 
Malaysia did not pursue the issue further. China, true to 
Tun Razak’s observation, were "not particularly anxious to 
have them".^ This attitude could be attributed to the 
following factors: that they were elderly people who were
9. New Straits Times, 2 June 1974, p. 1.
10. ibid.
11. ibid.
61
well beyond their prime age; the strong sentiments against 
returned overseas Chinese which reached its climax during 
the Cultural Revolution; and the assurance by Tun Razak that 
the "permanent residents who have not acquired Malaysian 
nationality may continue to stay in Malaysia".1L
Malaysia on the other hand felt that in the long-run the 
issue would die a natural death and there was no need to 
push it further. Furthermore, taking the experience of 
Indonesia it was believed that sorting out this issue would 
create more problems than it solved. For security reasons 
Malaysia could not afford to give an opportunity for the 
Chinese Embassy to have unimpeded access to the Chinese 
community. It should also be borne in mind that Malaysia’s 
insistence that the issue be agreed upon in the communique 
was motivated more by the desire to obtain the assurance 
from the Chinese Government that this group of people should 
not enjoy extraterritoriality. Also the 200,000 or so 
stateless were mostly elderly people and were in fact a 
dying breed. The status of their children posed no problem 
as most of them would have acquired Malaysian citizenship 
either by operation of law, naturalisation or registration. 
It should be noted that a child born in Malaysia could 
become a citizen by operation of law if either of the 
parents was a Malaysian. If children of stateless people
12. ibid.
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failed to qualify by this provision they could always apply
for citizenship by registration or naturalisation as
virtually all would have more than fulfilled the residential
qualification - an aggregate of not less than ten years out
13of the previous twelve years.
Conclusion
In the joint communique signed by Tun Razak and Zhou 
Enlai the issue pertaining to the severance of fraternal 
links between the CPC and CPM was not explicitly mentioned. 
Zhou nevertheless alluded to China's belief that it would be 
against China's "internationalist duty" to sever links with 
another non-revisionist communist party. Thus after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations China followed a 
dual-track policy, simultaneously maintaining
government-to-government and party-to-party relations which 
in no time became an irritant in Malaysia-China relations.
13. For details see Articles 125, 127, 131 of the 
Constitution of Malaysia.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE LINGERING IRRITANTS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS
...the People’s Republic of China adheres to a 
policy of maintaining governraent-to-government 
relations while at the same time maintaining 
party-to-party relations with the communist 
insurgents in the region. Insofar as this 
dichotomy exists, it will be difficult to 
envisage any further progress in our 
relations.
Ghazali Shafie, 
12 October 1981,
The two main issues that on the surface seemed to have 
been solved with the establishment of diplomatic relations - 
agreement on nationality and the mutual adherence to the the 
five principles of coexistence - kept on haunting Malaysia- 
China relations. The posture taken by China to dichotomise 
Government-to-Government and party-to-party relations became 
a perennial problem. China’s reluctance to sever its 
relation with the CPM caused Malaysia to restrict its 
relations with China to the Government-to-Government level. 
Nevertheless there were other underlying reasons. The 
predominantly Chinese character of the CPM and the peculiar 
nature of the Malaysian demographic composition underpinned 
its policy.
The uneasiness over the fraternal links between the CPC 
and the CPM continued to be felt by Malaysia even during the 
premiership of Tun Razak when the euphoria caused by the 
China visit was still at its peak. The fall of Phnom Penh
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and Saigon to the communists in May 1975 boosted the sagging 
morale of the CPM. Consequently, apparently to prove the 
point that the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
China did not in any way affect their morale and ' will-power 
to wage terror, there was a sudden upsurge of communist 
guerilla activities in Malaysia. Tun Razak termed the sudden 
resurgence as the "New Emergency” .^  The CPM launched a 
number of successful terrorist attacks including the bombing 
of the National Monument in the heart of Kuala Lumpur, the 
assassinations of the Inspector-General of Police and the 
Chief Police Officer of Perak in broad daylight, and 
sporadic grenade and rocket attacks on Police Field Force 
headquarters and police stations all over Malaysia. The 
number of police and security forces killed rose and there 
was a growing fear that the government could not contain the 
guerilla activities.
Despite protests made by Malaysia, no attempts were made 
by China to close down the clandestine broadcasting station, 
"Suara Revolusi". In fact it became more virulent in its 
attacks against the Razak ’'clique". When the CPC, in 1975, 
sent a congratulatory message to the CPM on its 45th 
anniversary which was given wide coverage by the "Suara 
Revolusi" and also in the journal "Peking Review", Tun Razak 
ordered an official protest to be made to the Chinese
1. For a detailed account see Richard Stubbs, "Peninsular 
Malaysia: The "New Emergency", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 50 
No. 2, 1977, pp. 240-262.
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oambassador in Kuala Lumpur. It became evident to Malaysia 
that despite the establishment of diplomatic relations and 
the mutual adherence to the five principles of coexistence, 
China would not downplay but continue with its moral support 
to the CPM. Possibly internal political struggle in China 
itself made it difficult for the Chinese government to 
appear to be falling down in its "internationalist duty".
After the establishment of diplomatic relations the ban 
on visits to China by Malaysians and the stateless Chinese 
residing in Malaysia was slightly relaxed. Social visits, 
besides trade, were allowed. Nevertheless the conditions 
remained stringent. Only those who could meet one or more of 
the following conditions could be given permission:
-be 65 years of age or more, in which case the 
applicant may make only one visit;
-to visit close relatives;
-to seek medical treatment;
-to attend a trade fair;
-on official duty either representing the Malaysian
r>government or international organisations.
The official reason given by the government for the
continuance of the restriction was China 1s insistence on
maintaining its links with the CPM.  ^However factors like
2. Cited in William Shaw, Tun Razak: His Life and Times,
Longman, Kuala Lumpur, 1976, p. 231.
3. Asiaweek, 16 March 1984, p. 15.
4. Asian Almanac, 1979, pp. 9807-9808.
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the Chinese-character of the CPM, the cultural pull of China 
towards the ethnic Chinese and the anti-communist policy of 
the Government at the domestic level should not be 
discounted as the primary reasons for the Malay political 
elite adopting such a policy.
Problems Inherited by Hussein Onn and Mahathir
A further complication arose due to internal political 
developments in Malaysia. The untimely death of Tun Razak in 
January 1976 and the power struggle that ensued within UMNO 
helped to further magnify the contradiction in 
Malaysia-China relations. The deep anti-communist sentiments 
among the Malays were exploited by UMNO members who were 
jockeying for power. Close associates of Tun Razak were 
accused of being communist moles in the Government and three 
of them, two Deputy Ministers and the editor of the 
UMNO-owned newspaper - the New Straits Times - were detained 
under the Internal Security Act.^ Datuk Harun, the 
controversial and charismatic ex-Menteri Besar (Chief 
Minister) of Selangor challenged the leadership of Tun 
Razak’s successor, Hussein Onn. In the midst of the power 
struggle and anti-communist furore, the UMNO General 
Assembly called on the government to be uncompromising in 
its anti-communist policy. The virulent criticism of China
5. For details of the power struggle within UMNO see Harold 
Crouch, "The UMNO Crisis: 1975-1977", in Crouch, H., Lee 
Kam Hing and Michael Ong (eds.), Malaysian Politics and
the 1978 Election, Oxford University Press, 1978, pp.
11-37.
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by the new leadership for maintaining party-to-party 
relations should be viewed within the context of the power 
struggle and the anti-communist bogey that was made use of 
by rival groups to prevent Tun Razak's supporters, 
purportedly leftist in their thinking, from gaining 
political prominence. Nevertheless, in contrast to Tun 
Razak’s use of the China issue to his political advantage in 
1974, the new UMNO leadership had no domestic political 
incentive to push for closer ties with China.
Under the premiership of Hussein Onn Malaysia’s 
controlled relationship became more cautious in nature. In 
the context of the heightened anti-communist atmosphere in 
UMNO Hussein, who had a military and legal background and 
was not personally responsible for the normalisation of 
relations, had no qualms in castigating China for its moral 
support to the CPM. Unlike Tun Razak, who accepted the fact 
that China would continue its fraternal links and believed 
that Malaysia should solve the problem itself through more 
aggressive counter-insurgency activities, Hussein Onn clung 
to the ’’catch-all” phrase of the communique which declared 
that "all foreign aggression, interference, control and 
subversion are impermissible’’. He publicly took China to 
task when Deng Xiaoping, the first high level Chinese 
dignitary to visit Malaysia since the normalisation of 
relations, was in Kuala Lumpur in November 1978. Deng, whose 
visit was to counter the earlier ASEAN tours of the 
Vietnamese Premier, Pham Van Dong, and the Russian Deputy
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Foreign Minister, Nikolai Firyubin, was told that Malaysia
"would like to be left alone in peace, free from any form of
£interference, subversion or incitement" , a blunt message 
for China to cease support to the CPM. He went on to say 
that:
If I sound to be concerned, it is because the 
stability and safety of my country are being 
threatened.. . . I cannot afford to be 
indifferent when there is so much at stake for 
ray country.7
Hussein’s blunt statement could be attributed to Deng’s 
insensitivity to Malaysia’s (as well as ASEAN’s) feeling. 
Prior to his arrival in Kuala Lumpur, Deng made a statement 
in Bangkok that China could not afford to disassociate
Qitself from supporting local communist insurgents. While
in Kuala Lumpur Deng turned down a Malaysian proposal to
include a wreath-laying ceremony at the National Monument in
9his official programme. The Monument was erected to
honour the police and soldiers who had died fighting the CPM 
during the Emergency. Deng's attitude contrasted sharply 
with that of Pham Van Dong who not only visited the Monument 
but publicly came out with a statement that Vietnam had 
ceased giving support to the CPM and that it would not 
interfere in the internal affairs of Malaysia.
Malaysia was bitterly disappointed when Deng Xiaoping
6. New Straits Times, 11 November 1978, p. 21.
7. ibid.
8. ibid.
9. Asian Almanac, op. cit.
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did not give any assurance to cease giving moral support to 
the CPM. In his meeting with Hussein Onn, Deng said that the 
maintenance of fraternal relations "was an important point 
of principle" that could not be changed "without serious 
international implications’’. ^  Malaysia did not accept 
Deng’s rationale that China had to continue to espouse the 
cause of the CPM lest the Soviet Union or Vietnam would take 
over China’s role. Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, then the Home 
Minister, dismissed such possibilities as the CPM was not 
only predominantly Chinese but staunchly pro-Beijing in 
outlook. ^  Hussein Onn went even further by questioning 
the usefulness of having diplomatic relations with China. He 
commented:
It takes two to have an agreement. If we 
cannot agree what does the other do? Do we 
have no diplomatic relations at all or do we 
have diplomatic relations? Or do we say we 
understand what to us sounds a bit illogical 
but to them is logical.12
Deng’s statement on party-to-party relations and the
rationale for maintaining such links received sharp
13criticisms from the ASEAN members. Lee Kuan Yew during 
his visit to China in November 1980, expressed ASEAN’s 
uneasiness to Premier Zhao Ziyang. In fact Lee intended to 
make the issue the main theme of his speech at the banquet 
hosted by Zhao. However at the request of the Chinese that
10. New Straits Times, 13 November 1978, p. 13.
11. Asian Almanac, op. cit.
12. New Straits Times, op. cit.
13. Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 Dec. 1978, pp. 19-21.
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Chinese that the issue be kept away from public arena, Lee
had to forgo the speech-making tradition. Instead he was
given the opportunity to raise it in an unscheduled
meeting with Deng Xiaoping. To prove its good intention
China promised to discontinue the clandestine "Suara
14Revolusi . It was closed down in June 1981 only to be
resumed the following day under a different name - "Voice
of Malayan Democracy" - from a different wave-length
operating somewhere in southern Thailand. To Malaysia and
the other ASEAN countries the change was cosmetic and did
not mark any progress in relations. In fact, before its
closure, the "Suara Revolusi" announced its broadcasts would
be resumed on another wavelength, thus strengthening the
suspicion that China had a role not only in relocating the
the station but also in its operation.^
Chinese support for the CPM continued to hamper the
improvement of relations between the two countries. In 1981
the Foreign Minister described Malaysia’s relations with
China in the following words:
Insofar as this dichotomy [government-to
government and party-to-party] exists, it will 
be difficult to envisage any further progress 
in our relations... Premier Zhao was not able 
to convince us that China was prepared to give 
up her party-to-party links. In this respect 
therefore there has been little progress since 
the visit of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping.16
14. For an account of the visit see Asiaweek, 21 November
1980, p.20.
15. The Age, 25 August 1981, p. 9.
16. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 14 No. 4, December 1981, 
p. 442.
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In fact throughout the 1980s - until the visit of Malaysia's 
fourth Premier, Dr. Mahathir to Beijing in November 1985 - 
Malaysia continued to show its displeasure over China's dual 
track policy. When the Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, 
visited Malaysia in March 1980, Malaysia sent to the gallows 
three CPM members convicted for various terrorist acts, a 
stern message to China that the communist menace was real 
and Malaysia would not relent in its efforts to decimate 
them. In January 1981 when the Chinese Minister of State 
Farms and Land Reclamation was in Kuala Lumpur, the 
Malaysian government took the opportunity to publicise the 
statement of Musa Ahmad, the disaffected former Chairman of 
the CPM who was allegedly smuggled out of his exile in China 
by the Malaysian authorities. It should be noted that since 
the banning of the CPM in 1948 most of its leaders were 
given refuge in China by the Chinese government. Prominent 
among them were the Chin Peng (Secretary-General), Chin 
Tien, Abdullah Che Dat (CD) and Rashid Mydin.^^ In his 
statement Musa Ahmad warned that China's willingness to stop 
overt support to pro-Peking insurgent communist movements in 
the region was merely a tactical ploy to win favour. It was 
only a matter of expediency for the CPC had promised the CPM 
moral and material support and had vowed that the struggle 
would continue even if there were only two or three
17. Asiaweek, 24 April 1981, pp. 28-32.
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1 ftguerillas left in Malaysia.0 This statement, whether it 
was doctored by the Malaysian authorities or otherwise, was 
to convey to the Chinese that Malaysia still regarded China 
as a threat to its security.
In this regard Prime Minister Mahathir stirred the 
diplomatic community when he said that he did not believe 
that Vietnam had either the capacity or immediate motivation 
to invade the ASEAN countries,^ confirming the statement 
made earlier by his Foreign Minister, Tan Sri Ghazali 
Shafie, that ”We see China as a bigger danger
regionally... because the Chinese have links with
20CPMM. Subsequently Malaysia even brought the issue 
the CPC and CPM links to the 1981 UN General Assembly.
Sri Ghazali said:
...We in Southeast Asia...face a rather bizarre situation when our hands are being 
shaken by a government in the name of 
friendship, yet the political party from which the government is formed, as if there is a 
real dichotomy, declares openly to us in our 
faces, of their commitments to continue to support albeit morally and politically, ille- 
egal and terroristic groups that are striving 
daily to overthrow by violent means our respective governments....We...regard this as 
a policy of rotten fish being served in the 
specialized recipe of sweet and sour dish.21
18. For the full statement of Musa Ahmad see Sabda & Wahba, 
Musa Ahmad Kembali Kepangkuan, Penerbitan Tra Tra 
Kuala Lumpur, 1981, pp. 191-205.
19. Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 August 1981, p. 13.
20. Sunday Star, 16 August 1981, p. 1.
21. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 14 No. 3, September 1981, p. 247.
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A second problem is the Chinese attitude to Chinese 
Malaysians. With regard to the strict limitations on travels 
to China, Hussein Onn, with his straight-forward 
interpretation of the 1974 Joint Communique, continued with 
the restriction policy. In 1979 he informed the Malaysian 
parliament that:
The Malaysian relationship with PRC was still 
based on the joint communique signed in 1974 
....The government had no intention of lifting 
restrictions on social visits to China as it 
continues to support the communist group 
operating within Malaysia. The matter would be 
reviewed from time to time in accordance with 
changes taking place in China.22
However in the 1980s, especially during the premiership 
of Mahathir, the question of social visits became an 
additional irritant. It was discovered that Malaysian 
Chinese were able to circumvent the restriction with the 
connivance of the Chinese authorities. They would travel to 
Hong Kong or Macao and from these places proceed to China on 
Chinese travel documents. The suspicion of the Malaysian 
government was first aroused with the discovery of 
unexplained gaps between the date of the Hong Kong or Macao 
exit stamp and the entry stamp made on the return trip. It 
was the air crash in Guangdong province in September 1983, 
involving the death of 16 Malaysians, that confirmed the 
suspicion. Two of the victims were discovered to have 
travelled to China without the permission of the Malaysian
22. Asian Almanac, op. cit.
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the permission of the Malaysian authorities but were issued
- 23by the Chinese authorities with Chinese travel documents.
Malaysia registered its displeasure at this attitude of 
the Chinese when the Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, visited 
Malaysia in February 1984. Musa Hitam, then the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Home Affairs, warned Wu of the 
implications of China giving special treatment to Malaysian 
Chinese and issuing them with entry permits which were 
exclusively meant for overseas Chinese returning to China. 
Musa argued that this in effect meant that China still 
recognised Malaysian Chinese as Chinese nationals, thus 
making them "less Malaysian and sabotaging the government’s 
efforts towards national integration".^ More importantly 
it ran counter to the agreement embodied in 1974 Joint 
Communique by which China declared that it did not recognise 
dual nationality and that the overseas Chinese who had taken 
or acquired Malaysian nationality would automatically 
forfeit Chinese nationality.
Although Wu denied the existence of such a policy he did 
not deny the possibility of slip-ups made by immigration
officials at border posts and promised to look into the
complaint. However this issue should not be viewed in
isolation. It should be seen within the framework of China’s 
ever-shifting policy towards people of Chinese descent
23. Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 March 1984, p. 49.
24. ibid.
75
overseas. It should be noted that in 1978 the Office of the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs (OACA) was established to take over 
the role of the Chinese Affairs Commission that was
dissolved during the Cultural Revolution. Its main function 
was to attract overseas Chinese contributions to the Four 
Modernisations Programme irrespective of whether they were
o cChinese nationals or otherwise. The statements made by
Liao Chengzhi, the Director of the OACA, who was also a
member of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the
provision of the 1982 Constitution of China further
strengthened the suspicion that China had not totally
abandon the jus sanguinis principle. Liao considered that
all overseas Chinese who had taken up foreign nationalities
were still "our kinsfolk and f r i e n d s a n d  constituted
...a force we should rely on....The majority 
of them are patriotic and eagerly wish to see 
a strong motherland with a higher 
international status....We should work
energetically among them...and strive to form 
the broadest patriotic united front among the overseas Chinese...27
Meanwhile the 1982 Constitution stipulates that "China 
protects the lawful rights and interests of returned 
overseas Chinese and of the family members of Chinese 
nationals residing abroad".The interpretation of this
25. See Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 January 1978, pp. 
21-22, and Leo Suryadinata, ojk cit. pp. 79-97.
26. Peking Review, 20 January 1978, p. 16.
27. Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, 5 January 
1978, p. E16.
28. Cited in Leo Suryadinata, oj). cit. , p. 81.
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Article was never defined by the Chinese, thus adding 
further suspicion about China’s real attitude.
Given Malaysia’s displeasure with China - its 
party-to-party relations and the accordance of special 
treatment to Malaysian Chinese - Mahathir sidestepped the 
official invitation delivered by Wu Xueqian for him to visit 
China to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the establishment 
of Malaysia-China diplomatic relations. Instead Mahathir 
sent his Foreign Minister, Ghazali Shafie.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE DILEMMAS OF THE MAHATHIR ADMINISTRATION: TRADE
OR SECURITY?
In analysing the reasons behind the lack of 
sustained progress in our bilateral 
relations, we must face squarely the 
inescapable conclusion that our inability to 
completely resolve certain core bilateral 
issues to mutual satisfaction have had the 
effect of impeding the overall growth of 
relations.
Mahathir Mohamed, 
20th November 1985.
New Realism in Relations with China
The first decade of Malaysia-China relations was 
dominated by political polemics revolving around China’s 
insistence on maintaining fraternal links with the CPM and 
to some extent the special treatment accorded to Malaysians 
of Chinese descent by the Chinese government. They in the 
the main impeded the overall growth of bilateral relations. 
Unhappy with the fact that Malaysia was not taking the 
fullest advantage of China's economic liberalisation policy, 
Mahathir ordered the formation of a special task force in 
May 1984^ with the objective of reviewing Malaysia’s 
guarded and arms-length relationship with China. Thus when
1. Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 July 1985, p 12.
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he visited Beijing in November 1985 he sidestepped the 
perennial contentious issues and impressed upon the Chinese 
leadership that economic cooperation could offer "exciting 
possibilities’’^  and expressed the desire to see the tempo 
of bilateral relations in the second decade dominated by 
economic cooperation.
Mahathir’s pragmatic approach was spurred by several 
factors. Firstly, Malaysia realised that little could be 
achieved by going over old ground, particularly on the 
CPC-CPM links. The ASEAN countries have concertedly tried to 
prevail on the Chinese but with little success. Secondly, 
Malaysia was concerned with the lack of sustained growth in 
trade and economic ties which in part emanated from 
Malaysia’s stringent policy of confining its relations to 
the Government-to-Government level. Restrictions on business 
visits, particularly the tedious process of obtaining 
authorisation, were part of this. Despite being the first 
ASEAN country to have diplomatic relations as well as having 
a long history of uninterrupted trade links with China,
Malaysia’s export growth was minimal as compared to the
performances of the other ASEAN countries. For example
between 1980-1984 Indonesia' s exports grew from US$ 14
million to US$ 214 million, the Philippines from US$ 70
million to US$ 82 million whereas Malaysia’s exports
plummetted from US$ 240 million in 1980 to a low of US$ 120
2. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 18 No. 4, December 85, 
p.391.
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million in 1981, reaching a figure of US$ 193 million in 
1984 (see Table III). Mahathir's concern about trade was 
motivated by Malaysia's urgent need to arrest the decline in 
its balance of payments. With the slump in the prices of its 
primary commodities, beginning from 1980, Malaysia for the 
first time since independence faced a trade deficits 
problem. Thus, a more practical China policy, without 
compromising Malaysia's security needs, would be 
economically beneficial for it would not only help rectify 
the ever-growing trade imbalance (see Table IV) but would 
also provide Malaysian entrepeneurs ample opportunities to 
invest and participate in China's development projects.
Prelude to Dr. Mahathir's China Visit
The Foreign Minister, Ghazali Shafie, who was in China 
in May 1984 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the 
establishment of diplomatic relations, essentially paved the 
way for Mahathir to concentrate more on economic discussions 
by raising all the contentious issues with the Chinese 
leaders - the CPC-CPM fraternal links; the special treatment 
accorded to Malaysian Chinese who travelled to China without 
authorisation from the Malaysian government and China's 
preference to conduct trade through Chinese middlemen rather 
than PERNAS.
On the question of CPC-CPM links Ghazali unequivocally 
underscored Malaysia's concern and suggested three ways 
for China to cut off its ties: either to abandon the
CPM without more ado or force it to dissolve itself as most
TABLE III
CHINA*S TRADE WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA
(In US$ million)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
INDONESIA
Imports 21 54 46 49 70
Exports 14 63 151 150 214
Total Trade 35 117 197 199 284
MALAYSIA
Imports 184 191 181 186 196
Exports 240 120 156 215 193
Total Trade 424 311 337 401 389
PHILIPPINES
Imports 258 256 236 143 233
Exports 70 117 137 45 82
Total Trade 328 372 373 188 315
SINGAPORE
Imports 
Exports 
Total Trade
421
190
611
658
113
771
648
103
751
567
114
681
1209
141
1350
THAILAND
Imports 312 228 168 195 251
Exports 140 154 347 135 188
Total Trade 452 382 515 330 439
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
Data based on Chinese trade figures.
TABLE IV
MALAYSIA-CHINA TRADE 
(in M$ million)
Year Exports Imports Volume Deficits
1978 251 509 760 -258
1979 397 487 884 -90
1980 471 551 1022 -80
1981 204 632 836 -428
1982 258 640 898 -382
1983 364 626 990 -262
1984 283 811 1056 -283
Source : Malaysia Yearbook(si, 1977- 1975.
Data based on Malaysian trade figures.
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of its leaders were in China or to issue a statement 
repudiating ’’movements advocating armed struggle against a 
government with which China has proper relations”.^  
Malaysia would accept any of these moves as a sign of good 
faith on the part of China. However China stood firm to its 
oft-stated position and the Malaysian leadership at last 
drew the conclusion that it was futile to seek Chinese 
cooperation in eradicating the problem. Perhaps in deference 
to Malaysia’s sensitivities, China reduced the profile of 
the fraternal relationship between the CPC and CPM through 
the non-publication of party-to-party fraternal messages in 
government-run media.^
Regarding the special treatment accorded to Malaysians 
of Chinese origin through the issuance of special travel 
documents by the Chinese authorities, China was responsive 
to Malaysia’s concern and assured that no further 
unauthorised visits would be entertained in the future. Wu 
Xueqian impressed on Ghazali that consistent with Hu 
Yaobang’s speech in Tokyo in December 1983, distinctions 
would be drawn between overseas Chinese and Chinese who are 
nationals of China. Hu Yaobang in his meeting with 
Ghazali also pledged that China would ’’never ask people of
3. ibid.
4. Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 July 1984, p. 13.
5. For details of the statement see Xinhua News Agency 
Weekly Issue, 1 December 1983, pp. 18-19.
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Chinese origin to do things detrimental to the interests of 
their countries of residence".^
On economic relations Malaysia registered her
dissatisfaction with China’s preference to conduct her trade 
with either Malaysian Chinese or Chinese middlemen in Hong 
Kong or Singapore rather than through the state corporation, 
PERNAS. Malaysia explained that such actions would
exacerbate the apprehension about China’s attitude towards 
the overseas Chinese as well as undermine Malaysia’s efforts 
for a balanced distribution of wealth under the New Economic 
Policy. He impressed on the Chinese that Malaysia would like 
to see China adopting a multi-ethnic approach in conducting 
its trade with Malaysia. While appreciating Malaysia’s 
concern, China pointed out to Ghazali that the shortcoming 
was partly caused by Malaysia’s stringent business travel 
restrictions which forced China to depend more on its 
traditional commercial contacts in Singapore and Hong Kong 
who were invariably people of Chinese descent. China also 
hinted to Ghazali that the relaxation of travel restrictions 
could enhance direct trade. It also expressed interest to 
import more rubber and a few Malaysian-made ’’Proton Saga” 
cars on a trial basis.^ Indeed China was serious about 
buying the "Proton Saga" and the first ten of the twenty 
units ordered were delivered during Mahathir’s visit.
6. Yahuda, M., "China and the Region", in Southeast Asian 
Affairs 1985, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore, 1985, p. 64.
7. Far Eastern Economic review, 4 July 1985, p. 12.
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Though Ghazali's visit did not achieve any breakthrough, 
it in fact led to some rethinking on the part of Malaysia. 
It strengthened Malaysia’s view that China’s modernisation 
programmes coupled by its adoption of a market-oriented 
economic system provided both economic and political 
opportunities. It was felt that Malaysia should take 
advantage of China’s economic liberalism and while it was 
preoccupied with its ’’Four Modernisations” Malaysia should 
take the opportunity to strengthen its national resilience 
to meet the perceived long-term threat from China. 
Significant too was the fact that Ghazali was the first 
Malaysian official, after the historic visit of Tun Razak in 
1974, to have made a visit that was essentially businesslike 
in nature.
Managing a Controlled Relationship with China
On his return from Beijing, Ghazali made several 
concrete recommendations to the Government to ensure that 
Malaysia was not left behind in the economic opportunities 
offered by China. Consequently the Government strengthened 
the task force that was formed in May 1984 by transforming 
it into a more powerful inter-ministerial committee with the 
twin objectives of putting Malaysia’s relationship with 
China on a more stable footing and to facilitate trade and 
investments.
The inter-ministerial committee came out with a 
comprehensive paper entitled "Managing a Controlled
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Relationship with the PRC” with inputs from all the 
economic and security-related government agencies and the 
various Chambers of Commerce. The paper was considered and
Oadopted at a special Cabinet meeting on 6 June 1985,° some 
five months before Mahathir’s visit in November 1985. Among 
the most important recommendations adopted by the Cabinet 
were:
-Streamlining the procedures of obtaining Malaysian travel 
documents to visit China for business purposes. A 
one-stop processing agency comprising representatives 
from the Foreign Ministry, Home Affairs and Trade was to 
be established. Bona fide applicants would be given the 
security clearance within a time frame of not more than 
two weeks and would be allowed to apply for
multiple-entry visas from the Chinese authorities. 
Hitherto the procedure was rather cumbersome. Applicants 
were allowed to apply only for single-entry visas on a 
case-by-case basis and the applications were referred to 
the various agencies which at times took months to 
process;
-To have closer government-to-government links through 
economic-related agreements namely The Avoidance of
8. See James Clad’s article entitled, "An Affair of the 
Head”, in Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 July 1985, pp. 12-14. Clad was later charged for breaching Sections 8 
(1) and 8 (2) of the Official Secret Act for having in 
his possession secret information and divulging it to the 
public. Clad pleaded guilty to both the charges. See Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 24 October 85, p. 37.
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Double Taxation Agreement; Investment Guarantee Agreement 
and Shipping Agreement. It was perceived that these 
government-to-governraent agreements could facilitate 
economic and trade collaboration;
-Promotion of direct trade by encouraging private sector 
involvement in trade which had hitherto been solely 
handled by PERNAS. In an effort to undercut China’s 
tendency to have business dealings only with Malaysian 
Chinese the Government was to encourage direct trade to 
be handled by the Sino-Malay Joint Chambers of Commerce;
-In the realm of security the paper also underlined the 
possibility of a recurrence of Chinese support for 
insurgent movements. It recommended that Malaysia had to 
continue building up its national resilience - including 
economic strength. However the paper was not totally 
pessimistic in tone for it did not totally foreclose the 
possibility of China discarding its former destabilising 
policies. Malaysia felt that rapid economic progress 
would make China behave more responsibly in conducting 
its foreign relations especially with the Southeast Asian 
region which it regards as its sphere of influence in its 
rivalry with the Soviet Union.
Visit of Dr. Mahathir
Arising from the new pragmatism and the mandate given by 
the cabinet decision of 6 June 1985 Mahathir, during his 
China visit in November 1985, focussed his discussions more 
on economic issues. The fact that he spent six days out of
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his nine-day schedule touring the provinces and special 
economic zones reflected his desire to see Malaysia taking 
the maximum advantage from the opportunities offered by
China’s economic liberalism •
Although Mahathir did not raise the contentious issues
in his discussions with the Chinese leaders, he did remind
the Chinese that the growth of overall relations had been
impeded by the inability of both sides "to completely
resolve certain core bilateral issues to mutual
satisfaction",^ a reference to the CPC-CPM links and the
special treatment given by China to Malaysians of Chinese
descent . He went further to register Malaysia * s uneasiness
by commenting at the state banquet that:
...leaders of China have assured us on many
occasions that some of these issues are
"leftovers from history and that time will
resolve them". While admittedly [sic] that
time is a great healer, I hope we will not
allow history to hold the progress of our
relations to hostage.10
In underscoring the irritants Mahathir told China not to be
"mired and shackled to historical legacies and
fidelities".^
9. Foreign Affairs Malaysia t Vol. 14 No. 4, December 1985, 
p. 391.
10. ibid.
11. ibid.
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Economic Cooperation
As the visit of Mahathir was arranged months ahead of 
schedule, including the adoption of the "controlled 
relationship" concept, the private sector had ample time to 
secure business deals which could be concluded during the 
the visit. In fact, for the trip Mahathir was accompanied by 
a contingent of more than 150 businessmen and to give 
significance to his economic emphasis several contracts were 
signed by the Malaysian enterepeneurs on the occasion. Some 
of the major ones were:
-the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding by Sabah 
Gas with the China Metallurgical Import and Export 
Corporation to supply the latter with hot briquetted iron 
over a period of two years;
-a contract signed by the Sino-Malay Joint Chambers of 
Commerce for the construction of villas and office blocks 
in Fujian province;
-a joint venture agreement signed by the QBS System 
(Malaysia) Sdn. Berhad for the construction of a trade 
and science technology centre and a luxury country home 
project for expatriates just outside Beijing."1 
All in all during the visit the private sector concluded sales 
contracts amounting to M$57 million and construction and
1 ointerior design contracts worth M$480 million.
12. Berita Malaysia, December 1985, p. 1.
13. New Straits Times, 5 December 1985, p. 7.
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At the governraent-to-government level the visit saw the 
conclusion of the Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement 
which was meant to encourage entrepeneurs from both sides to 
trade and enter into joint-ventures without being taxed 
twice. On balance, however, the agreement would benefit the 
Malaysians more as they were the ones who have the capital 
and expertise to invest in China rather than the reverse. 
Nonetheless, to China the agreement constituted another 
facet of its policy in attracting more foreign investments.
The other agreement was on direct trade signed between 
the Sino-Malay Joint Chambers of Commerce and the 
government-owned China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade. These two agencies were also given the 
monopoly on barter trade. China welcomed this arrangement as 
it would save her much needed foreign exchange for her 
development efforts while it fitted nicely into Malaysia’s 
policy of encouraging trade with China to be conducted on 
multi-ethnic basis.
Another promising area of cooperation broached by 
Mahathir was shipping, including the cargo-sharing concept 
by which the respective national shipping lines would 
reserve some space for each other’s cargo, so as to minimise 
overhead costs. In connection with shipping cooperation and 
direct bilateral trade Malaysia also requested COSCO (China 
Ocean Shipping Company) to appoint more agents in Malaysia 
as then it had only one sub-agent with its headquarters in 
Singapore, to service the five COSCO ships calling monthly 
at Port Klang and Penang. China showed some interest in the
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proposal of having a shipping agreement but at the same time 
expressed dissatisfaction with the discriminatory policy of 
the Malaysian authorities for not allowing Chinese sailors 
to come ashore when their ships berth at Malaysian ports. 
Notwithstanding this progress, the Government is yet to 
conclude the full complement of agreements that are 
essential for the steady growth of economic ties, especially 
within the context of Malaysia’s ’’controlled relationship’’ 
concept, namely agreements on Trade, Shipping and Investment 
Guarantee. The last two that were initiated during 
Mahathir’s visit are still being negotiated.
Conclusion
While Mahathir had laid the foundation for greater 
economic and trade relations between the two countries, the 
future depends very much on the private sector. The 
Government could only facilitate the private sector’s role 
by relaxing its regulations and signing agreements that are 
necessary to encourage trade and investment. Preliminary 
research done by the Institute of Strategic and 
International Studies (ISIS) of Malaysia showed that neither 
the Sino-Malay Joint Chambers of Commerce (SMJCC) nor PERNAS 
has lived up to the Government’s expectations. The SMJCC 
failed to carry out follow-up action and it was unable to 
provide services to would-be Malaysian importers and 
exporters while PERNAS, which has been handling the China 
trade since 1971, appeared not to go beyond collecting
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commission fees from its clients. This made the 
Government’s effort to promote multi-ethnic trade links with 
China a difficult task to achieve. It is envisaged that the 
Malaysian Chinese, with their expertise and traditional 
commercial network, will continue to dominate the China 
trade for many years to come. At the individual level very 
few of the Malay businessmen were able to speak Mandarin let 
alone knowledgeable about Chinese rules and regulations. 
Furthermore, they lacked perseverance and were more inclined 
to go for quick profits offered by business deals with 
Malaysia’s major trading partners in the West, Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan.
While Mahathir’s visit, according to an editorial of
the New Straits Times, "has supplanted decades of brooding
distance with a more positive and forward-looking approach
towards doing business with a China that is obviously more
open to do business - and more capable - than i t was in
1974”15 nevertheless the perception that China is the
long-term threat to Malaysia ’s security still looms . Though
Malaysia feels comfortable with the policy of the present
Chinese leadership, Malaysia believes that the political
14. ISIS Mimeograph still in draft form written by Zainuddin 
Bahari and made available to the writer.
15. See editorial New Straits Times, 30 November 1985.
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situation is still fluid. Mahathir commented:
[We]...still feel that it is possible for 
changes to take place. We have to maintain 
this attitude, this scrutiny of our 
relationship at all the time to make sure that 
if there is any change, we will not be caught 
napping... 16
In his address to the students of Qing Hua University in
Beijing, Mahathir also spoke of Malaysia's concern about
China's intentions towards Southeast Asia and the long-term
implications of its military modernisation. He said:
Historically small countries in the
peripheries of big and powerful state have 
always had reason to be wary. In this 
connection, we welcome the many assurances 
that China will never seek hegemony and will 
never do anything to harm us...I ask that you 
understand us, if despite these assurances 
some concerns linger on, for...trust does not 
come easily to us in view of our past
experience.17
16. New Straits Times, 28 November 1985, p. 7.
17. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, op. cit., p. 404.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUING THREAT
While China does not as yet possess the 
capacity to wage war far beyond its borders, 
it does have the capacity to strike at the 
core of our vulnerability - internal 
subversion through its support for the 
insurrectionist Communist Party of Malaya and 
national cohesiveness through its wooing of 
ethnic Chinese in Malaysia.
Ghazali Shafie 
3rd May 1985
Malaysia’s Threat Perception
Although Malaysia’s attitude towards China has changed 
markedly since 1957 suspicions still persist. The publicity 
given to the return to Malaysia from China of the Chairman 
of the CPM, Musa Ahmad, in 1981 and the adoption of the 
’’controlled relationship" concept were a few of the many 
manifestations of Malaysia’s assertion that China 
constitutes a long-term threat to its security. However with 
China’s preoccupation with the Four Modernisations Programme 
Malaysia perceived that China is unlikely to be an immediate 
threat to its security as the successful implementation of 
the programme entails a period of internal stability as well 
as maintaining cordial and friendly relations with the 
countries of the region. Furthermore, in its desire to check
the influence of the Soviet Union - within the context of
the Hanoi-Moscow axis - it is imperative for China to
maintain its existing posture towards the ASEAN nations.
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Though Malaysia feels comfortable with the policy of the 
present Chinese leadership there are many imponderables that 
make the Malaysian political elite apprehensive. The 
commitment of the second echelon leaders to Deng’s 
pragmatism and economic liberalism remains suspect. China’s 
past support for communist insurrection in the Southeast 
Asian region is a grim reminder of its past belligerent 
behaviour and it has a worrying record of sharp reversals of 
policies. . Moreover, the success of the modernisation 
programmes could produce an even bigger threat in the 
long-term as China’s policy after obtaining economic and 
military strength is still a matter for conjecture. It was 
in the context of these imponderables that Mahathir made the 
statement that Malaysia would always be wary of the China 
threat and would not like to be caught ’’napping”.
As far as Malaysia is concerned the Chinese threat 
could emanate both from within and without but concern for 
the internal threat is most worrying. The ex-Foreign 
Minister of Malaysia, Ghazali Shafie, in underscoring this 
perception, once said:
...the Chinese threat could manifest itself from within. To us this is even more 
dangerous. Clear-cut foreign aggression is 
easily identifiable and world reaction to it is predictable. Foreign-backed subversion 
...has always been a grey area in 
international politics. Apart from this, China has extensive territorial claims in the South 
China Sea to almost 30 miles off the coast of 
East Malaysia.1
1. Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, United States-Southeast Asia 
Relations: the Challenges Ahead”. Paper presented at the 
39 Annual Conference of the World Afairs Council of Northern Carolina,(Mimeograph), p. 11.
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In the main a possible Chinese threat could originate 
from the Beijing-oriented CPM insurgent movement; the 
Malaysian Chinese minority; spillover from the Kampuchean 
conflict and China’s claims in the South China Sea.
CPC’s Links with the CPM
The double-faced diplomatic strategy of China, by 
differentiating governraent-to-government and party-to-party 
relationships, has generated suspicions about China’s real
intention towards the region. While Malaysia is able to
contain the CPM, the dimension of the threat would be
markedly destabilising should the CPM receive material
support from without. It is perceived that the dual-track 
policy of China is a matter of political expediency whereby 
it would give it the option to use the CPM as a source of 
leverage if the need should arise. As most of the top CPM 
leaders are now residing in Beijing and their political 
propaganda is being tacitly supported by the Chinese 
Government, either through the Voice of the Malayan 
Democracy (formerly known as Voice of the Malayan 
Revolution) or the goverment-owned ’’People’s Daily’’, China 
could try to revitalise the subversive activities of the CPM 
as and when it liked. The situation becomes more complex 
with the unique racial mix of the Malaysian population and 
the domination of the CPM by Malaysians of Chinese descent. 
Thus China could simultaneously exploit ideological, racial 
and cultural issues to subvert Malaysia.
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The Presence of Malaysian Chinese Minority
The overseas Chinese are both an asset and a liability 
to China in its dealings with the Southeast Asian nations 
and over the years it has shown a substantial ability to 
shift positions. They have been treated as part of the 
Chinese nation and "patriotic national front" as well as 
foreign nationals who "are still our kinsfolk and 
friends". China has sometimes been prepared to abandon 
them, as in the case of Pol Pot’s genocidal policy, but on 
the other hand became their champion overnight when they 
were discriminated against in Vietnam.^ China appears 
hesitant whether to treat them either as (i) its citizens or 
(ii) foreign capitalists or (iii) useful source of foreign 
capital and expertise in its modernisation programmes or 
(iv) an "expendable bargaining commodity to extract 
concessions on more important issues."^
As far as Malaysia is concerned doubts continue to exist 
about China’s real attitude towards the Malaysian Chinese. 
Despite its declaration that it does not recognise dual 
nationality in the Joint Communique of 1974, it continues to 
giving treatment that was reserved only for Chinese citizens 
to Malaysian Chinese. The issuance of "returned overseas
2. Editorial, Peking Review, 20 January 1978.
3. ibid, 20 January 1978, p. 16.
4. See Leo Suryadinata, o_£. ci t. , p. 65.
5. Dalton, J., "Southeast Asia and China since 1975", Asian 
Defence Journal, October 1984, p. 23.
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Chinese" travel documents unearthed in 1984 and the
invitation to prominent Malaysian Chinese to go to China to
celebrate "our" anniversary (communist takeover)0 in late
1984 created doubts that China had not totally abandoned the
jus sanguinis principle. Being a multi-racial nation
Malaysia has to be wary of China’s attitude for:
However integrated Chinese Malaysians are 
within the body politic, one hundred percent 
success cannot be counted upon. A few can do a 
great deal of harm....To do this harm, China 
would require no substantial military 
capability and would not need to make a 
substantial commitment of resources. To set 
off dynamite, all one needs is a box of 
matches.7
Spillover from the Kampuchean Conflict
The Kampuchean factor appeared in Malaysia’s threat 
perception soon after its occupation by Vietnam in 1978. 
ASEAN’s declared solution to the conflict seems in 
congruence with that of China, that is the withdrawal of 
Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people 
being allowed to choose their own government. However 
Malaysia (and Indonesia) is not prepared to go along with 
China’s policy of bleeding Vietnam white as it would like to 
see a viable Vietnam that would rely less on Soviet support, 
thus reducing super-power rivalries in the region. Secondly,
6. Yahuda, Michael, oj£. cit. , p. 65.
7. Noordin Sopiee, Malaysia’s Strategic Envronment: One
Perspective of the Present and Future, Institute of 
Strategic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur, 1984, p. 15.
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the presence of a strong Vietnam could be expected to 
dissuade China from viewing Southeast Asia as a backyard for 
the spread of its influence. In the main, Malaysian security 
plannners would like to see a viable Vietnam as a buffer 
between ASEAN and China.®
Although Malaysia has strongly opposed the Vietnamese 
occupation of Kampuchea, it does not want to see either the 
restoration of the pro-China Pol Pot regime or the 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the Vietnamese-backed Heng 
Samrin regime. Malaysia prefers a political solution as 
opposed to the existing military conflict, for it will (i) 
deny China the chance of weakening Vietnam, (ii) restore the 
independence of Kampuchea as it entails the withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Kampuchean soil and (iii) minimise the 
possibility of China or Vietnam dominating Kampuchea thus 
removing the direct threat to the security of the ASEAN 
nations. On the other hand, should the conflict escalate 
Vietnam in the long-run might be weakened, leaving the 
Indochina region open to Chinese hegemony.
Conflicting Claims in the South China Sea
The South China Sea is another source of conflict 
between the ASEAN states and China. In 1975 China produced 
its official map claiming some 127 scattered and largely
8. See Nair, K.K., ASEAN-Indochina Relations, Strategic and 
Defence Studies Center, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1984, pp. 171-181.
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uninhabited coral, cays and sandpits (see Map I) including 
the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, as well as the 
Tseng-mu Reef, which is in Malaysian waters, lying just 20 
miles off the coast of the state of Sarawak. Thus disputes 
have broken out between China and the ASEAN states of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The complexity of 
these claims and counterclaims have increased with the
adoption of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by the
littoral states (see Map II).
To China the importance of these islands is twofold. The
South China Sea represents one of the world’s most strategic
shipping routes as trade from the Straits of Malacca pours
into the South China Sea. Equally important is the oil
potential of the basin. From Peking’s point of view, the
strategic importance of the islands in the South China Sea
has grown tremendously since the withdrawal of the US from
Vietnam as underlined by the Peking Review in 1975:
The South China Sea is an important junction 
for navigation and an important maritime 
gateway from China's mainland and nearby 
islands.... The South China Sea Islands are 
very important geographically as a key link on 
the arc shipping lane between Kwangchow, Hong 
Kong, Manila and Singapore.9
So far China has not shown any tendency to use force 
against the ASEAN countries to strengthen its claim or 
negotiating position. The posibility that it would use it, 
in the manner that she took over the Paracels from Vietnam
9* Peking Review, 12 December 1975, p. 10.
MAP I
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SOUTH CHINA SEA: CHINESE CLAIMS
Source: Harrison, Selig, China, Oil, and Asia Conflict Ahead?, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1977.
MAP II 100
DISPUTED AREAS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
-------------------------• MIDLINES DRAWN WITH ISLAND GROUPS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
------------------------ m id l in e s  draw n  ig n o r in g  ISLAND GROUPS
............................. BOUNDARY OF HAINAN SPECIAL ADMINISTRATION DISTRICT
P “  Thi-tu and 4 other islets held by the Philippines.
R Reed Bank drilling by a Philippine-Swedish US (Standard Indiana) consortium. 
T ■« Itu-aba and a few other islets held by Taiwan.
V -  Spratly Is. and 12 other islets held by Vietnam.
Source: Choon-Ho Park, "Legal Status of the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands", OceanDevelopment and International LawJournal, Vol. 3 No. 1, 1975.
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in 1974, should not be discounted once it acquires real 
super power status. Chinese occupation of these islands 
would threaten the security and economic well-being of the 
littoral states as their strategic locations would make 
infiltration of men, material and general supplies to these 
states a much easier exercise.
Outlook for the Future
Given Malaysia's demographic composition and the 
continued existence of the pro-Beijing CPM as well as the 
dominance of Malay political power, Malaysia will continue 
to view China with apprehension. While Malaysia is likely to 
continue to consolidate its relations at the 
government-to-governraent level, it seems unlikely that it 
will cease to perceive China as a threat or drastically 
change the existing "controlled relationship".
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APPENDIX A
JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE*S REPUBLC OF CHINA
At the invitation of His Excellency Chou En-lai, Premier 
of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, His 
Excellency Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein, Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, visited the People’s Republic of China from May 28 
to June 2, 1974. His Excellency Prime Minister Tun Abdul 
Razak was accompanied by representatives of political 
parties in the Government and government officials.
During his visit, Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak called 
on Chairman Mao Tsetung and conveyed to him the best wishes 
of the Malaysian Government. They had friendly and frank 
talk .
Premier Chou En-lai, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and
Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak had wide-ranging talks on
various subject matters of bilateral, regional and
international nature. These talks were held in a frank and
friendly atmosphere . The two Prime Ministers agree that in
recent years the situation in Asia has undergone deep
changes favourable to people of all countries. It is in
conformity with the interests of the people of China and
Malaysia to normalize the relations between the two
countries. To this end, the two Prime Ministers have decided 
to announce the normalization of relations between their two 
countries by issuing this joint communique.
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1. The Government of the People's Republic of China and 
the Government of Malaysia, with a view to promoting the 
traditional friendship of the two peoples, have decided upon 
mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic 
relations as from the date this communique is published.
2. The two Government hold that although the social 
systems of the People's Republic of China and Malaysia are 
different, this should not constitute an obstacle to the two 
Governments and peoples in establishing and developing 
peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries on 
the basis of the principles of mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual 
non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful 
co-existence. The two Governments consider all foreign 
aggression, interference, control and subversion to be 
impermissible. They hold that the social system of a country
should only be chosen and decided by its own people. They
are opposed to any attempt by any contry or group of
countries to establish hegemony or create spheres of
influence in any part of the world.
3. The Government of Malaysia recognizes the Government 
of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal 
Government of China, and acknowledges the position of the 
Chinese Government that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the 
territory of the People's Republic of China. The Malaysian
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Government decides to close down its consulate in Taipei.
4. The Government of the People’s Republic of China 
recognizes the Government of Malaysia and respects the 
independence and sovereignty of Malaysia.
5. The Government of the People’s Republic of China 
takes note of the fact that Malaysia is a multi-racial 
country with people of Malay, Chinese and other ethnic 
origins. Both the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of Malaysia declare that they do 
not recognize dual nationality. Proceeding from this 
principle, the Chinese Government considers anyone of 
Chinese origin who has taken up of his own will or acquired 
Malaysian nationality as automatically forfeiting Chinese 
nationality. As for those residents who retain Chinese 
nationality of their own will, the Chinese Government, 
acting in accordance with its consistent policy, will enjoin 
them to abide by the law of the Government of Malaysia, 
respect the customs and habits of the people there and live 
in amity with them. And their proper rights and interests 
will be protected by the Government of China and respected 
by the Government of Malaysia.
6. Premier Chou En-lai and Prime Minister Tun Abdul 
Razak agree that the two Governments, in conformity with 
international practice, will provide each other with all 
necessary assistance for the establishment and performance 
of the functions of embassies in their respective capitals,
and that ambassadors will be exchanged as soon as
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practicable.
Sgd. Sgd.
TUN ABDUL RAZAK BIN 
DATUK HUSSEIN
Prime Minister of Malaysia.
CHOU EN-LAI
Premier of the State Council 
of the People’s Republic of 
China.
Peking, May 31, 1974.
Source: Siaran Akhbar, Jabatan 
5/74/183 (HALUAR)
Penerangan Malaysia, PEN.
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